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Whatever is the most awful place you have experienced, Kibera is worse. 
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Abstract 
Populations in urban slums continue to rise due to the relatively affordable shelter 
provision. Most slums are neither planned nor formal and therefore lack basic service 
delivery. Despite the fact that the majority of inhabitants in these slums are low-wage 
earners, they are forced to pay more for basic needs such as water than their neighbours 
in ‘affluent’ and ‘well-to-do’ neighbourhoods. This paper analyses the water governance 
problems in Africa’s arguably biggest slum Kibera (Kenya), and zeroes in on the Public-
Private Partnership between the two biggest water suppliers in the slum, who, due to 
their troublesome partnership, have considerably contributed to the on-going water 
governance chaos. It also attempts to make plausible recommendations for remedying the 
problems. By discussing some theoretical standpoints and relating them to the study, we 
find that they provide strengths to the analysis despite some weaknesses in their 
theoretical foundations. Our main conclusions are that the water governance problems in 
Kibera are multi-faceted in which corruption has been a factor disrupting the governance 
system and aggravating the water governance problems; and consequently there should 
be some alternatives to improve the situation. This include convening multi-lateral and 
bilateral dialogues on effective water governance involving the stakeholders, and 
establishing an Association of Water Consumers, who will represent and protect all the 
households using water in Kibera. 
Key words: slum, water governance, Kibera, Public-Private Partnership, corruption, 
alternatives, dialogues, stakeholders, Association of Water Consumers 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
MBK Maji Bora Kibera 
NCC Nairobi City Council 
NWC Nairobi Water Company 
PPP(s) Public-Private Partnership(s) 
PWV(s) Private Water Vendor(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
           Page 
Chapter 1. Problem Formulation       1 
1.1. Subject Area …………………………………………………………… 1 
1.1.1. The general water situation in Kenya………………………………… 1 
1.1.2. Kibera and the water supply situation ………………………………. 4 
1.1.3. Public-Private Partnership in Kibera ………………………………..  8 
1.2. Background and pre-understanding …………………………………… 8 
1.3. Research Question ……………………………………………………… 9 
1.4. Working questions ………………………………………………………. 10 
1.5. Methods ……………………………………………………………........ 10 
1.6. Limitations ……………………………………………………………… 13 
1.7. Concept definitions …………………………………………………..… 14 
1.8. Chapter overview …………………………………………………….… 15 
 
Chapter 2. Methodology        17 
2.1. Governance …………………………………………………………..… 18 
2.1.1. Characteristics of good governance ………………………………..… 23 
2.2. Water governance ……………………………………………………… 26 
2.3. Institutions ……………………………………………………………… 28 
2.4. Public-Private Partnership…………………………………………….… 30 
2.4.1. Types of Public-Private Partnership ………………………………..… 31 
2.4.2. Characteristics of Public-Private Partnership ………………………… 32 
2.5. Relations among the theories…………………………………………..… 33 
 vi 
2.6. Summary………………………………………………………………..… 34 
 
Chapter 3. A Brief Introduction to Global and National Water Governance 35 
3.1. Global water governance ………………………………………………. 35 
3.1.1. The Dublin Principles for water ……………………….……………. 35 
3.1.2. The dialogue on effective water governance …………………………. 36 
3.2. Water governance in Kenya ……………………………………………. 38 
3.2.1. Regulative institutions………… ……………………….……………. 39 
3.2.2. Organisations ……………….…………………………..……………. 40 
3.2.3. Political Perspectives …………………………………………………. 43 
3.2.4. Water Pricing …………………………………………….……………. 45 
3.3. Summary …………………………………………………………………. 46 
 
Chapter 4. Analysis of the Water Governance in Kibera    48 
4.1. Institutions …………………………………………………………………. 48 
4.1.1. Regulative institutions – formal rules of the games ……………………. 48 
4.1.1.1. Non-implementation of the water law ……………………………….. 48 
4.1.1.2. A compromised legal and justice system ………………….………… 49 
4.1.2. Organisations …………………………………………………………. 50 
4.1.2.1. Formal organisations ………………………………………..……… 50 
4.1.2.2. Informal organisations ……………………………………………… 52 
4.1.2.3. Interactions between formal and informal organisations 
 – informal rules of the games ………………………….……………. 55  
4.2. Economic instruments and financial flows …………………………….. 60 
4.2.1. Water charges ………………………………………………….…….. 60 
4.2.2. Fines, Subsidies and Taxes ………………………………………….. 61 
 vii 
4.2.3. Billing and metering system ………………………………………… 62 
4.3. Participation …………………………………………………………… 63 
4.4. Political intervention ………………………………………………….. 64 
4.5. Information exchange and communication ……………………............ 65 
4.6. Summary ………………………………………………………………. 65 
 
Chapter 5. Analysis of the Partnership between Nairobi Water Company  
and Maji Bora Kibera        67 
5.1. A brief introduction to Nairobi Water Company……………………….. 67 
5.1.1. Establishment and organisation ……………………………………… 67 
5.1.2. Mission and meter-bill related issues ………………………………… 69 
5.2. A brief introduction to Maji Bora Kibera ……………………………… 70 
5.2.1. Establishment and organisation ……………………………………… 71 
5.2.2. Vision and mission …………………………………………………… 73 
5.3. Partnership between Nairobi Water Company and Maji Bora Kibera … 73 
5.3.1. History ……………………………………………………………….. 74 
5.3.2. Existing partnership problems and their effects on  
          water supply for Kibera’s poor ………………………………………. 76 
5.3.2.1. Lack of mutual understanding, respect and trust …………………… 76 
5.3.2.2 Decision Making and Sharing of Management Responsibilities …… 77 
5.3.2.3. Principles of transparency, accountability, legitimacy  
and legality, equity, inclusiveness, and competition ………………… 77 
5.4. Summary ……………………………………………………………… … 78 
Chapter 6. Possibilities for improving the current water governance 
 crisis in Kibera          79 
 viii 
6.1. The pre-condition for introducing the possibilities …………………… …. 79 
 
6.2. Establishing a local water governance dialogue  
       involving a broad participation ………………………………………  79 
6.2.1. Why local water governance dialogues? ……………………………  79 
6.2.2. Who should participate? ……………………………………………  81 
6.2.3. Issues to be discussed ………………………………………………  82 
6.3. Establishing bilateral dialogues between NWC and MBK ………….  84 
6.4. Forming an Association of Water Consumers ……………………….  85 
6.5. Some reflections on the recommendations ……………………………  87 
6.6. Summary ………………………………………………………………  88 
Chapter 7. Conclusions        89  
References          94 
Appendices  
Interview Transcripts ………………………………………………… 103 
Kibera Pictures ………………………………………………………. 124
 1 
CHAPTER 1. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
1.1. Subject Area 
1.1.1. The general water situation in Kenya  
 
Map of Kenya
1 
Located in East Africa, Kenya is an agriculture-based country with a land mass of 
approximately 592,000 sq. km. The country’s reliance on agriculture for its economic 
expansion implies that water is the basic element for development. The annual quantity of 
renewable fresh water resources is estimated at 20.2 billion m³. This comprises of 19.59 
m³ of surface water and 0.62 billion m³ of ground water.2 The actual amount of water 
available for utilization in any one year is dependent on a variety of factors, such as the 
rate of run-off, the aridity of the catchment area and the methods of interception at 
                                                 
1 Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.html 
2 Joseph Oginga Onjala: Managing Water Scarcity in Kenya, Ph. D. Thesis, Roskilde University 
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various points in the hydrological cycle. With a population of 31 million people, the 
average water supply is approximately 690 m³ per capital per annum whereas the global 
benchmark is 1,000m³ per capital per annum. This has resulted in the classification of 
Kenya as a chronically water scarce country3.  
Water scarcity and shortage has resulted in volatile situations in various parts of the 
country. Already, skirmishes over water have been reported in many parts of the country 
as people fight over this scarce commodity. For example, by March 2005, more than 50 
people had been reported killed in the Mai Mahiu area, 80 kms south-west of Nairobi. 
According to a leading Kenyan daily on the day violence rocked Mai Mahiu: 
The bone of contention is the use of River Ewaso Kedong’, whose volume of 
water has reduced drastically because of the current drought. The Maasai, who 
live downstream, claim their neighbours upstream are using the river water for 
irrigation, thereby complicating the drought situation for themselves and their 
animals.4  
The following are just a rough sample of water-related headlines on Kenya’s water 
situation: 
i. March 22, 2005 - Half of all Kenyans lack safe water or sanitation: minister5 
ii. March 16, 2005 - UNICEF Voices Horror At Brutal Slaughter of 16 Children 
in Kenyan Water Feud6 
iii. March 9, 2005 - Violence Escalates over Water Troubles in Kenya7 
iv. January 31, 2005 - Clashes Over Water Access Resume In Kenya8 
                                                 
3 Joseph Oginga Onjala: Managing Water Scarcity in Kenya, Ph. D. Thesis, Roskilde University 
4 http://www.eastandard.net/hm_news/news.php?articleid=11470   
Also see Margaret Neighbour’s Hundreds flee in Kenya after water clashes kill 13 available at 
http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=86362005  
5 
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=1540&ncid=1540&e=4&u=/afp/20050322/sc_afp/envi
ronmentwaterun_050322194806  
6 http://allafrica.com/stories/200503160512.html  
7 http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/news/spotlight/spotlight_article.cfm?id=BC99C6EB-2E2F-
45DD-B2F3-F4D549FF77B2&region_id=5&subregion_id=0&issue_id=7  
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v. January 25, 2005 - Thousands flee Kenyan water clash9 
vi. April 23, 2003 - Baboons attack girls in Kenya for scarce water10 
Kenya’s water has substantially decreased in the last 25 years as a result of depletion of 
water bases like forests. The World Bank Report, Towards Water-Secure Kenya, 
correctly fore-saw the water crisis threatening to disrupt social and economic activities 
across Kenya. This has come true with the skirmishes that pit community against 
community and humans against wild animals. This, as cited in the report, has been 
caused by poor water management and unpredictable weather.11  
Further research has shown that currently: 
There is a third of the water that was available to people 30 years ago. In another 30 
years it will be down to a third of current levels... The population is rising, and the 
catchments area for water is declining. Kenya now has just 1.7% of forest, far 
below the 10% recommended for any country.12 
Originally, Kibera, the area we shall focus our research on, was a forest. The whole forest 
is now gone as more and more people ‘invade’ Kibera for cheaper accommodation. It is 
not our intention to argue that the residents of Kibera are to blame for the water scarcity 
affecting them as a result of deforestation and destruction of other water catchment areas. 
However, it is important to note that the environmental impacts of depletion of water 
catchment areas affect not only those who are involved, but also the innocent (including 
future generations, and those who may not live in close proximity to the destroyed area). 
The water sold in Kibera is pumped from dams constructed in the previously ‘high 
rainfall’ areas of Sasumua, Ruiru and Thika in the environs of Nairobi. Currently, Nairobi 
(and Kibera in essence) is experiencing a drastic reduction of volumes of water supplied 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-01-31-voa55.cfm  
9 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4201483.stm  
10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2968075.stm  
11 www.irc.n/page/9312 
12 Urban Water Solutions available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1454_urbansolutions/page2.shtml 
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because of ‘destruction of the catchment forests which has changed weather patterns and 
led to acute run-offs with resultant siltation problems in dams and intakes’.13 
Kenya’s Water Resources and Management Minister is concerned about the situation and 
asserts that, as of 2004, half of Kenya’s population continued to suffer from contaminated 
water-related ailments and diseases. The Minister also adds that in accordance with the 
latest statistics, 80% of Kenya’s population has been in lack of access to adequate water 
supply.14  The majority of Kenyans who have no reliable access to safe water are the poor 
inhabitants living rural areas and in urban slums. Considerable time is spent by rural and 
urban households in the search for clean drinking water. In many rural areas, school-age 
going children, especially girls are forced to drop out of school. They then spend the day 
travelling long distances to rivers to fetch this precious commodity. The situation is 
worse in urban informal settlements that account for 60% of the total urban population. 
The UN 2004 World Water Development Report ranks Kenya in the 154th slot among the 
180 countries listed for water availability per person per year.15 This implies that the 
country is lagging behind as far as provision of clean drinking water for its citizens is 
concerned. 
1.1.2. Kibera and the water supply situation  
Kibera lies at an altitude of 1,670m above sea level, latitude 36 degrees 50˚  east and 
longitude 1 degree 17˚ south about 140 km south of the equator. Kibera’s growth as an 
informal settlement is closely connected with Nairobi city’s phenomenal growth. 
The Kibera Slums, an area 5 kilometres south East of Nairobi City Centre, is the largest 
informal settlement in Africa, housing more than one quarter of Nairobi’s population. 
The name ‘Kibera’ is a Nubian word for ‘forest.’ The original settlers were Sudanese foot 
soldiers who settled there after fighting for the British in World War I. The need for 
                                                 
13 Nairobi’s Response to Water Crisis available at: 
http://www.unhabitat.org/HD/hdv6n3/nairobi_response.htm  
14 www.angolapress-angop.ao/noticia-e.asp?ID=259532 
15 Vendors Make a Kill as Water Shortage Persists available at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200501240532.html  
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cheaper housing has led to a population explosion in Kibera, whose current population is 
estimated to be more than 1 million inhabitants squeezed into an area of roughly 2 km².  
 
Map of Kibera
16 
Kibera is divided into nine official villages, each with its own Village Elder. They are: 
Kianda, Soweto, Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi, Laini Saba, Siranga/ Undugu, Makina, and 
Mashimoni. These villages, excluding Raila (which is not officially recognized, and 
                                                 
16 http://www.accesskenya.info/maps_city_wnew_mid1.asp  
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therefore not included in the above list) rest on the northern half of the valley east of 
Nairobi Dam. There are no residential buildings over a single storey. The average home 
size in Kibera is 3 metres by 3 metres, with an average of five persons per dwelling. 
Urban services such as water or sanitation are minimal. There is an average of one pit 
latrine for every 50 to 500 people. Living structures are constructed haphazardly on every 
available space leaving narrow alleys Gatuikira which serve as open sewers and footpaths. 
The alleys are so narrow at some points that it is difficult for a slightly build person to 
squeeze through. Kibera perhaps suffers the greatest water shortage in Kenya. In terms of 
water sources, Kibera relies on hawked water drawn from piped water, boreholes and the 
polluted Nairobi River to meet its water needs. Drinking water is pumped through plastic 
pipes along side sewage trenches. 
.  
Plastic water pipes crossing a sewage trench at Kisumu Ndogo Village Kibera 
These trenches carry refuse and human wastes to the river at the base of the valley. The 
river then runs into Nairobi Dam. Both the river and the dam are used for recreation (e.g. 
swimming) and resource (e.g. bathing; clothes washing). The plastic pipes are brittle and 
exposed, often breaking, to be repaired without care for sanitation. The pipes are jammed 
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or taped back together often without being cleaned, creating suitable habitat for water-
borne diseases like cholera and typhoid. 
Due to Kibera’s classification as an informal settlement, Nairobi City Council (hereafter 
referred to as NCC) officials feel they are not obligated to provide it with efficient 
services like water and a sewerage system because the inhabitants are considered to be 
living in Kibera illegally. Kibera’s residents thus have to buy water from street vendors at 
extremely high prices. We will examine water pricing in Kibera further in Chapter 3.  
Many attempts have been made to address Kibera’s water situation. Over decades and 
especially during the United Nations International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade 
(1981-1990), many water projects were set up and deployed in areas like Kibera. 
Nevertheless, governments, donor agencies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) have initiated water projects with little or 
even no involvement of beneficiary communities (supply-driven approach). Instead, the 
local governments have undertaken the operation and maintenance of these projects. Poor 
management structures and diminishing resources have made it difficult for governments 
to maintain and sustain these projects, leading to the collapse of many of the water 
projects. As a result, there has been a marked decline in water and sanitation coverage, 
access, and considerable loss of investments and user benefits. Slum areas like Kibera, 
were hardest hit by this unfortunate turn of events.  
One of the biggest paradoxes with the water situation, however, is that the available water 
is illegally connected from Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company, whose shorter name 
is Nairobi Water Company (hereafter referred to as NWC. This name will be applied for 
the whole project) to Private Water Vendors (hereafter referred to as PWVs) via a 
powerful group of ex- and present public servants of the company. Our interview with the 
technical director of NWC indicates that 99% of the company’s water is stolen and sold 
back to PWVs, who will then resell the water to end-users at exorbitant prices. According 
to the director, NWC “can’t do anything to stop the illegal connections” simply because 
the officials of the company claim they “would be beaten up” if they “dare” to enter 
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Kibera for checking or monitoring the water17. More details concerning this matter will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. 
1.1.3. Public-Private Partnership in Kibera  
In the turbulent water woes affecting Kibera’s poor, the Public-Private Partnership 
(hereafter referred to as PPP) between Nairobi Water Company (NWC) and Maji Bora 
Kibera (hereafter referred to as MBK), a type of private enterprise representing hundreds 
of small scale water vendors in Kibera and serving approximately 500,000 inhabitants, is 
worth being mentioned and studied. These two important players in the water sector had 
an acrimonious relationship, which worsened the situation of water supply, for a long 
time before they entered into a partnership in 2004. Furthermore, the relationship 
between NWC and other PWVs, the “independent” water vendors or water vending lone-
rangers (hereafter referred to as lone-rangers), are not better. Information from different 
sources has revealed that for years, these lone-rangers have offered erratic services. They 
ply their trade in Kibera without any government regulation or recognition. Given that 
almost all water connections in Kibera are illegal, it has been a cat and mouse game 
between these PWVs and ‘officials’ from the Nairobi City Council Water and Sewerage 
Department (now transformed into Nairobi Water Company). Kibera residents have had 
to go without water whenever it is disconnected by NWC, and water vendors reconnect 
the water once the disconnection team has left.  
The afore-mentioned status of water supply in Kibera has raised the question whether 
there are alternatives to improve the situation, such as to enhance the partnership between 
NWC and MBK, or to establish an association of water consumers. This study will 
therefore make an overall analysis of the water governance status quo in Kibera, slightly 
focus on analysing the NWC-MBK partnership and suggest some possibilities for 
improvement. 
1.2. Background and pre-understanding  
                                                 
17 Interview with the technical director of Nairobi Water Company 
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Many of the water problems that have been going on all over the world are termed as 
water crisis, and as Dr. Klaus Toepfer, Executive Director of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) stated, water crisis links to poor governance. The 
serious water crisis that Kenya generally and Kibera particularly has been facing is 
threatening to disrupt social and economic activities across the country as already 
mentioned. The solution to the water crisis is closely connected to improving water 
governance, and a paradigm shift is urgently needed for that purpose. Establishing and 
enhancing the partnership between the public and private sectors, as well as establishing 
an informal organisation (like an association of water consumers) are among the potential 
solutions to be taken into consideration.  
Public-Private Partnership (PPP), in broad sense, is a form of co-governance (Kooiman, 
2003) which helps to minimise the original costs that each sector has to spend and 
simultaneously maximise the benefits which both sectors can contribute (the level of 
costs and benefits depend on what method of operation they choose, of course). 
Examples of PPP from US, France, Australia, etc. have shown that PPP plays an 
important role in the efficient provision and management of infrastructure, health, 
industry and basic services. Concerning PPP in water and sanitation alone, the issue has 
been widely and internationally addressed. It has been acknowledged that the 
involvement of the private sector in partnership with government has been advocated as a 
means of improving the supply of water and sanitation services where the low-income 
consumers – the poor and the vulnerable groups should be involved (M. Sokhail Khan 
and Andrew Cotton, 2003; Kalyan Ray, UNHABITAT 2002). 
With this project, we would like to take part in the ongoing controversy about 
perspectives of governance, water governance (Kooiman, Rogers and Hall, Global Water 
Partnership, etc.), institution (North, Scott, etc.), and Public-Private Partnership 
(Kooiman, Vincent Kouwenhoven, etc.) and thereby generating a deeper understanding 
of water governance in Kibera.   
1.3. Research Question 
 10 
What alternatives can be taken into consideration in an attempt to improve the current 
water governance crisis in Kibera, Kenya? 
1.4. Working questions 
Analysing the factors that have hampered Kibera’s poor from accessing clean water 
implies investigating different dimensions, following these working questions: 
1. How is the water supply structure in Kibera? 
2. What are the current water governance problems? 
3. How is the relationship between Nairobi Water Company and Maji Bora Kibera? 
4. What possibilities exist for improving the situation? 
1.5. Methods  
In order to answer the research question and in essence the working questions, we have 
used a variety of methods going hand in hand with concrete analysis strategies, 
elaborated as follows:  
1. How is the structure of water supply in Kibera? 
We are going to solve this first question by reviewing official documents from Nairobi 
City Council (NCC), Nairobi Water Company (NWC), a special report on water theft by 
cartels in Nairobi by the Daily Nation titled Who are Nairobi’s Water Thieves?, and our 
local knowledge of the area supplemented by interviews with NCC and Maji Bora Kibera 
(MBK). 
2. What are the current water governance problems? 
This question is going to be tackled by: 
i. Reviewing some relevant literature to discuss some major theoretical standpoints with 
reference to how the concepts of governance (and thereby good governance), water 
governance, corruption and institutions have been viewed, debated and defined, and how 
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they are related to the context of Kibera’s water supply problems. We will base on the 
theoretical grounds in an integrated manner to present and analyse the water governance 
situation in Kibera in Chapter 4, especially when we assess whether the water governance 
is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Such aspects as the formal and informal organisations (equivalent to 
formal and informal institutional settings) and their interactions in water governance, 
laws and legislation, economic instruments, public participation, political intervention, 
information exchange and communication will be examined and analysed in line with the 
theoretical discussions.  
ii. Using the results of the face-to-face qualitative interviews we carried out during the 
field work. Participants in the interviews were some involved stakeholders in Kibera, 
such as Maji Bora Kibera, Monica Awino and Leornard Onyango (water vendors in 
Kibera), Nairobi Water Company, and water consumers. The interview questions were 
open-ended and loosely structured to allow for flexibility and adaptation depending on 
the interviewee(s) in question. The conducted interviews are especially significant in 
helping us understand a wide range of serious problems with clean water supply and 
access in Kibera, and simultaneously confirm the necessity of taking into consideration 
some possible alternatives to improve the situation. Most of the interviews were recorded.  
iii. Reviewing a certain number of available official documents, articles and assessment 
reports and special reports on the problems of water corruption-governance and PPP in 
Kibera done by different scholars, authors, independent institutions and organisations. 
We have decided to do so because analysing how water corruption and poor water 
governance, especially water corruption, has hampered and led to dismal performance in 
water supply to Kibera by the NWC was a very challenging task. This was partly because 
the involved people avoided touching upon the issue, partly because we were in danger of 
being unpleasantly “grilled” (while trying to make interviews with Private Water 
Vendors) by those who were receiving bribes to condone the theft of water from NWC 
which is then later on sold by Private Water Vendors (PWVs).  
3. How is the relationship between Nairobi Water Company and Maji Bora Kibera? 
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Answering this question demands understandings of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
concept and its characteristics, the history of the relationship between NWC and MBK 
and the problems that these two important water players have been coping with. We are 
going to review some related theories to discuss the PPP concept, present the 
characteristics and principles of PPP, and to analyse the interviews with NWC, MBK and 
water consumers. The theoretical part about PPP will then be applied in the empirical 
analysis in the way that we base on the characteristics and principles of PPP to discuss 
and analyse the problems NWC and MBK have coped with in their partnership.  
4. What possibilities exist for improving the situation? 
It’s our realisation that any possibilities of improving the current situation won’t be of 
high feasibility if Kibera (as a settlement) is not given official and legal recognition. 
Therefore, the formalised status of Kibera is regarded as a prerequisite for introducing the 
possibilities.  
Second, it’s important to establish local dialogues on water governance where the 
existing severe situation with regard to illegal water connections, exorbitant water prices 
suffered by Kibera residents and unhealthy competition among water vendors. 
Participants will be Minister of Water, NWC, MBK, Lone-rangers, the Chief and Village 
Elders, and the water consumers.  
Third, the relationship between NWC and MBK should be enhanced. It is not possible to 
enter into an improved working relationship without talking to each other seriously and 
regularly to figure out a strategic plan for the cooperation which will no doubt benefit the 
two parties. For that reason, these two players should have their own dialogues for 
thorough strategic discussions.  
Fourth, an informal organisation representing the water consumers should be founded for 
the purposes of protecting their water rights in terms of sufficient water supply, reduced 
water pricing, reduce bribery demands, and improve water payment service. In this part, 
we will review a variety of papers and documents, mainly those by Global Water 
Partnership, World Water Council, World Water Forum, Network for Water and 
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Sanitation (NETWAS); at the same time, the interviews with NWC, MBK, some Private 
Water Vendors, and water consumers will be employed. How the organisation should be 
organised will fundamentally be based on our knowledge of institutional theory and the 
study area. 
Taken all together, the methods used should: 
i. Enable us to complete the examination of the water governance chaos in which a 
troublesome Public-Private Partnership in water provision and the lack of an 
association of water consumers have hindered Kibera’s poor from getting access 
to affordable and sufficient clean water;  
ii, Provide us with adequate information in order to discuss some alternatives to 
partly work out the perennial water problems in Kibera. 
1.6. Limitations 
The problems of clean water supply in Kibera are quite multi-faceted. Within the scope 
of this study bound by time and information barriers, not all problems are analysed in-
depth. We consequently find it advisable to present and analyse the general water 
governance status quo in Kibera, and then slightly focus on the PPP between NCC and 
MBK. This is the first limitation of our project.  
Secondly, our study is not comprehensive and profound enough due to two main reasons. 
Firstly, once in Kibera, we realized that Kibera is not just another shanty-town where you 
can just walk in, introduce yourself and explain the purpose of your visit; and then 
request for interviews. Many studies have been conducted and there are a plethora of 
ongoing researches. Many people feel they are being used as guinea pigs. Most of the 
people we attempted to interview were outright angry and demanded to know what size 
of ‘potato’ they will be paid for information given. Many potential interviewees were 
adamant to answer any question because they ‘didn’t want any trouble’. Obviously in 
such a situation, it was not possible to get the complete picture. Valuable time was 
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‘wasted’ in rapport creating ventures with the water stakeholders in Kibera (e.g. going to 
church and visiting the local illicit brew clubs). 
Secondly, the concept of Public-Private Partnership is quite new in Kenya. During the 
writing of this project, it was hardly a year old. As such, even officials from both MBK 
and NWC, did not have up-to-date information about this concept. A check at Jomo 
Kenyatta Library (Kenyatta University) and University of Nairobi’s Main Library 
revealed the existing lack of research PPP under the Kenyan context. The invaluable tool 
of reference, essential for any academic research was therefore severely limited as far as 
PPP implementation in Kenya is concerned. 
1.7. Concept definitions  
In this study, we utilise a number of concepts such as water, poor people, economic good, 
public good, private good, Public-Private Partnership (PPP), governance, water 
governance, corruption, and private water vendors, which are necessary to be defined. 
Such versatile concepts as governance, water governance, corruption, institutions and 
PPP are elaborated in the related chapters and sub-chapters. Below are just some short 
definitions of the other concepts that won’t be clarified further.  
Water: the term water used in this project concerns water for such domestic use purposes 
as drinking, cooking, cleaning and bathing.  
Poor people: the concept of the term poor people used in this project refers to people 
living on less than $1 per day.  
Economic good: competition over a scarce source creates a situation where the price of 
the resource limits its availability to other users.18 
Private good: a good which is consumed by one person cannot be consumed by another 
person and access to this good is restricted.19 
                                                 
18 Begg David (2000), Economics: Sixth Edition, London, McGraw Hill 
19 Ibid p.p. 47 
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Public good: a good which if consumed by one person can still be consumed by another 
person. Access to this good cannot be easily controlled and is free to all.20 
Private water vendors: are entrepreneurs who sell water from tanks on trucks, wheel 
barrows and taps to where water is not available. They are also called “kiosk operators” 
in some documents, such as the World Bank Group’s.21 
Express: a word used in Kibera to refer to a consumer filling his water container without 
waiting on the queue. Express water costs double the normal price. 
1.8. Chapter overview 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical and conceptual framework of our project. We are going 
to discuss Kooiman’s theory of governance; Global Water Partnership and Rogers and 
Hall’s definition of water governance, North and Scott’s debates on institutions, Kooman 
and Vincent Kouwenhoven’s theory of Public-Private Partnership (PPP); and present the 
concept and distinctions of corruption by John Githongo and the World Bank 
supplemented by our reflections on bringing this concept in the governance discussions. 
Chapter 3 will discuss water governance from a global perspective before zeroing in on 
how this concept is realized in the country and area of our study. The Dublin principles 
for water and dialogues on effective water governance set the stage for an insight into 
Kenya generally and Kibera in particular. In this chapter, we will examine the institutions, 
the water pricing, the political perspective as well as the legal and regulatory framework 
in Kenya. The examination is the basis for analysing the area of our study – Kibera – later 
due to the fact that all the mentioned aspects are quite similar for national and local levels.  
Chapter 4 examines in detail the water governance in Kibera. We will present and 
analyse in details the legal framework, the regulative institutions, rules of the games, 
organisations and the interplays among organisations, the economic instruments and 
financial flows, the public participation, the political intervention, and the information 
                                                 
20 Ibid 
21 The World Bank Group: 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/0/EF572C35371203C5852567F5005D8CD0?OpenDocu
ment 
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exchange and communication status quo. The presentation and analysis are carried out in 
line with the theoretical grounds.  
Chapter 5 is an analysis of the PPP between NWC and MBK. We will present an 
introduction to these two players in water provision in Kibera and a history of their 
relationship. The partnership will be analyzed and major loopholes discussed in reference 
to how they augment and embolden Kibera’s water supply problems.  
In Chapter 6 we will present and discuss some alternatives for improving the ongoing 
water governance chaos, among which are the enhancement of the partnership between 
NWC and MBK and setting up an institution for protecting the water consumers.  
Finally, we draw some main conclusions in Chapter 7and give an outlook on intriguing 
issues within the area of water governance in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY 
Fathoming the water governance situation in Kibera is quite complex because the 
problems emanating out of the current situation are multi-faceted. We are accordingly of 
the opinion that we should first of all present and analyse the overall water governance 
situation in Kibera, and then focus on the qualitative analysis of one aspect, the Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) between Nairobi Water Company (NWC) and Maji Bora 
Kibera (MBK) for in-depth understanding.  
Throughout this project, critical standpoints relating to governance, water governance, 
corruption, institutions and Public-Private Partnership are presented with the aim of 
creating a holistic view of the political, social, economic and environmental aspects of 
water. The realisation of ‘ideal’ water governance practice in Kibera has proven difficult 
and thus inefficient, due to four main reasons.  
Firstly, since Kibera is categorised as an informal settlement, NCC doesn’t regard both 
the proper planning of the area (the current organisation of the area has made it nearly 
impossible to install water-pipes) and the efficient provision of basic services like water 
and sanitation as its responsibilities.  
Secondly, the NCC considers Kibera as a “no go area”.  Therefore it has not been able to 
tackle the perennial water corruption masterminded by a powerful clique of ex- and 
present employees of NWC.  
Thirdly, the legal and justice system in Kibera is a compromised system where both 
magistrates, judges and the crime police, including police investigating water criminals 
are bribed, and the offenders therefore prefer bribing the police officers instead of going 
to court where the bribe demands are much higher. This fact has caused complications in 
finding out what possible solutions for minimizing this bribery can be.  
Fourthly, the PPP between NWC and PWVs – a possible key element in helping work out 
water supply solutions for Kibera’s poor – still suffers from teething problems.  
 18 
Debating and analysing the afore-mentioned issues will be conducted via a discussion of 
Kooiman’s interesting and helpful theories of governance; Global Water Partnership, and 
Rogers and Hall’s definitions of water governance; John Githongo and the World Bank’s 
standpoints on corruption; North and Scott’s debates on institutions, and Kooiman and 
Vincent Kouwenhoven’s theory of PPP despite the fact that Kooiman and Vincent 
Kouwenhoven’s theories don’t deal specifically with water. This may appear too broad 
for others doing the same study, but it’s our point of view that the understanding of these 
theories and concepts will help us relate to the spectrum of the current problems 
concerning the provision of clean water in Kibera i.e. to create a foundation for viewing 
how the water governance in Kibera can be assessed to be “good” or “bad”, as well as 
considering how the improvement of PPP may partly help out the water governance crisis.  
2.1. Governance  
The concept of governance has widely been debated by many scholars, institutions and 
organisations, and become very used in economics and political science, since the 90s, 
and there are a variety of approaches to this concept. Keohane defines governance as “the 
making and implementation of rules, and the exercise of power, within a domain of 
activity” (Keohane 2002) while Rhodes refers to this term as “a pattern or structure 
which emerges from actors engaged in self-organising, inter-organisational networks 
characterised by degrees of interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and 
significant autonomy from the state” (Rhodes 1997, p.15).  
Governance perspectives have, furthermore, been presented under many labels, such as 
“governance” (Rhodes 1996, 1997), “local governance” (Stoker 1999, 2000), 
“international governance” (Young 1994), “global governance” (Meghnad Desai and 
Paul Redfern 1995; Young 1997), “modern governance” (Kooiman 1994), “water 
governance” (Global Water Partnership 2002), etc. 
For our project, we will focus on the theory of governance as espoused by Kooiman for 
the reasons mentioned after we have analysed his viewpoint of governance.  
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According to Kooiman’s theory, governance is “the totality of theoretical conceptions on 
governing” (Kooiman 2003, p.4), which is defined as “the totality of interactions, in 
which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or 
creating societal opportunities; attending to the institutions as contexts for these 
governing interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all those activities.” 
(Kooiman 2003, p.4) 
There are some key words and expressions to be analysed in this definition. First of all, 
by using “interactions”, Kooiman refers to “the multi-lateral relations between social and 
political actors and entities (individuals, organisations, institutions)” (Kooiman 2003, 
p.11). Secondly, the participation of the public and private actors in the “interactions” 
process implies the covering of both formal and informal organisations (the term he used 
for the combination for these two organisations is distributed governance) where the 
involvement of the public and private actors is particularly highlighted. Thirdly, 
“attending to the institutions as contexts for these governing interactions; and 
establishing a normative foundation for all those activities” refers to the specific contexts 
(institutional settings) for and norms of interactions.  
Still in the same work, three modes of governing are also developed and discussed: self-
governance (the capacity of social entities to govern themselves autonomously), co-
governance (the capacity of social and political actors to collaborate and cooperate in 
common affairs) and hierarchical governance (the top-down system). In co-governance, 
PPP is regarded as a form of co-governance, and this is interesting for us since we are 
discussing and analysing the problems of PPP in Kibera. The concept of PPP will be 
further presented in sub-section 1.4.1.4. 
We do find that Kooiman’s theory regarding governance is interesting and some aspects 
of his theory are relevant for our project. We agree with his views that governance 
concerns with not only the State but also a kind of relationship among the State, the 
private actors and the civil society. The same point of view is shared by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) when the United Nations Development 
Programme discusses governance for sustainable human development “governance 
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encompasses the state, but it transcends the state by including the private sector and civil 
society organizations”22, and in Roger and Hall’s approach of governance where these 
two scholars state that governance “embraces the relationship between a society and its 
government” (Rogers and Hall 2003, p.4). This aspect of governance is very important, 
and it is our recognition that the realisation of governance in a country can’t be successful 
without the participation of all mentioned actors. The case of water governance in Kibera 
is a good example to be analysed in Chapters 4 & 5.  
Kooiman, especially, while discussing governance, uses the term distributed governance 
to refer to the involvement of formal and informal institutions in the governance process. 
This term has indeed been widely stressed in the on-going global dialogues on effective 
water governance and approached from different angles. According to us, it should be 
regarded as worthy-considering and useful term for the Kibera case. Hence, we will 
mention distributed governance again in Chapter 2.1. when we present the dialogue on 
effective water governance; moreover, it will, in Chapter 5, be discussed in the initiative 
of establishing local dialogues on water governance in Kibera for the purposes of 
improving the working relationship between NWC and MBK, simultaneously creating 
awareness among water consumers of this partnership as well as making them understand 
their role in water governance.  
In our opinion, nevertheless, there are some weaknesses in his governance discussion. 
Firstly, among the modes or types of governance he discusses, he fails to take note of the 
importance of non-hierarchical governance. Experiences from different countries and 
localities in the world have shown that good governance requires both hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical governance. Relating to the current type of governance in both Kenya 
and Kibera, it is hierarchical, and this monopoly has caused inefficiency in governance 
generally and water governance particularly because the hierarchical steering has 
hampered the sufficient participation of civil actors. We thus do feel that the lack of the 
non-hierarchical mode that is missing in Kooiman’s theory makes it wanting.  
                                                 
22 UNDP: http://magnet.undp.org/policy/chapter1.htm 
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Secondly, in Kooiman governance theories (as far as the materials we have read 
concerned), corruption has not been touched upon whereas corruption is not a new 
phenomenon in governance existing both in developed and under-developed societies and 
it has become a hot issue of major socio-political-economic significance in recent years. 
Corruption has, in reality, allowed those with money or connections to bend the law or 
government rules in their favour. Some famous examples to support this statement are 
from USA (President Bill Clinton, the White water scandal in 1996), Pakistan (the 
government of Benazir Bhutto, accused of undermining judicial independence and 
engaging in massive corruption), India (the former Prime Minister Narashima Rao, 
accused of vote-buying, forgery and criminal conspiracy), and especially the most serious 
political crisis in the history of Italy relating to corruption happening when “more than 
500 former parliamentarians, many former ministers, five former premiers, thousands of 
local administrators and public functionaries, the army, the customs service (responsible 
for investigating financial crimes in general), the main publicly-owned companies and 
even sectors of the magistracy itself” 23  were implicated in the "Clean Hands" 
investigation of political corruption after 1992.  
Corruption, often defined using the equation Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – 
Accountability 24 ,  has been discussed under different labels: public corruption (the 
misuse of public office for private gain), private corruption (between individuals in the 
private sector, such as Mafia or gangs extorting money from a local business), 
administrative corruption (corruption that alters the implementation of policies, such as 
getting a license even if you don’t qualify for it, political corruption (corruption that 
influences the formulation of laws, regulations, and policies, such as revoking all licenses, 
and gaining the sole right to operate the beer or gas monopoly). Corruption is also 
distinguished among bribery (an offer of money or favours to influence a public official; 
nepotism (favouritism shown by public officials to relatives or close friends; fraud 
(cheating the government through deceit); and embezzlement (stealing money or other 
                                                 
23 Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/working_papers/country/italy_paper.html  
24 John Githongo 2000, Working Paper: Is there a constitutional Remedy to Corruption in Kenya? 
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government property).25 These diverse distinctions of corruption concept indicate that 
corruption has seriously occupied quite many aspects of different societies, how come it 
is not mentioned in Kooiman’s modern governance theory?  
For the concrete context of our study area, corruption has a special relation to governance 
generally and water governance in particular. According to Transparency International 
Kenya, which has made yearly surveys on corruption in Kenya, corruption is experienced 
by ordinary citizens in both public and private organizations, and bribes are categorized 
into five different purposes including law enforcement (i.e. avoiding the legal 
consequences of wrong doing, or harassment by the relevant authority), regulatory (e.g. 
obtaining licenses), access to services (e.g. health, school places, utilities), business (e.g. 
to obtain a contract or expedite payment), and employment (e.g. to get a job, promotion, 
transfer, training)26.  
It’s important to note that for years, Kenya has been among the “top countries” in terms 
of corruption. As John Githongo, the former Kenyan Permanent Secretary for 
Governance and Ethics and a founding member of Transparency International Kenya (an 
anti-corruption Non-Governmental Organisation) says, “corruption is the reason why 
many things have gone wrong in Kenya. It starts from the top and ends at the top.27" In 
his working paper “Is there a constitutional remedy to corruption in Kenya” (2000), he 
writes: 
The most serious corruption that we have seen in Kenya is the one perpetrated 
by ruling elites and their associates. The Goldenberg scam is the best illustration 
of the debilitating effects of this kind of corruption. On the economic front it 
caused dramatic slide in the value of the Kenya Shilling and a large jump in the 
inflation rate. Politically, the resources it availed affected the conduct of the 
1992 general election and served to dramatically diminish the credibility of the 
Kenyan government in the eyes of the international community…It had its 
                                                 
25 Introduction to Corruption, the World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35970/mod03.pdf 
26 Transparency International Kenya: 
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/KENYA%20BRIBERY%20INDEX%202004.pdf 
27 BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2670075.stm 
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social effects as well, entrenching an atmosphere of impunity with regard to 
corruption. 
Being a part of Kenya, Kibera is not an exception of the “public disease”28 corruption - 
public corruption, private corruption, administrative corruption, bribery, and 
embezzlement are all included in the Kibera case, especially with reference to water in 
such aspects as institutions, legal practice, and billing and metering. In our interview with 
the Organising Secretary of Maji Bora Kibera, the association of private water vendors in 
Kibera, we got the comment that “bribery is in people’s blood”. In our study area, we do 
feel that the absence of corruption in the governance discussions is a short-coming. We 
will, however, still bring corruption into our discussion and analysis of the governance, 
particularly the water governance system, in Kibera in the related Chapter 4.  
2.1.1. Characteristics of good governance 
For this project, a clear elaboration of the governance concept isn’t enough because it still 
demands us to answer the question how we are going to appraise a governance system to 
be good or bad when we present and discuss the water governance problems in Kibera. 
Kooiman hasn’t defined yet how governance can be regarded as being good or bad. 
However, our research on different sources from the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP), the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the Global Water Partnership, etc. have yielded some similar 
characteristics contained in good governance. We find that the characteristics by the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP) 
are most well-covered, and we thus decide to present these elements in this sub-section. 
These characteristics are also those we will base upon to assess water governance in 
Kibera. 
According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UN ESCAP), good governance must have 8 major characteristics, which are: 
participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and 
                                                 
28 This term is employed by Politiken in the article titled “Korrupt Kenya skuffer atter Danmark” (roughly 
translated: Corrupt Kenya disappoints Denmark again) dating back Wednesday 23, February 2005.  
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efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. All these eight 
characteristics are figured as follows: 
 
Source: The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP) 
Accountability 
Accountability indicates that governmental institutions, the private sector and civil 
organizations must be accountable to those who will be affected by their decisions or 
actions.  
Transparency 
Transparency means three things. Firstly, the taking of decisions and their enforcement 
are done in accordance with rules and regulations. Secondly, information is freely 
available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their 
enforcement. Thirdly, enough information is provided in understandable forms and on 
media.  
Rule of law 
Rule of law refers to fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially and full 
protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. The impartial enforcement of 
laws hereby requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police 
force. 
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Participation 
Participation implies the involvement of both men and women in governance either 
directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such 
broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to 
participate constructively, namely participation needs to be informed and organized. 
Responsiveness 
Responsiveness in good governance means that policies are implemented in a 
proportionate manner within a reasonable timeframe, and decisions are to be taken at the 
most appropriate level. 
Consensus oriented 
This characteristic refers to the consultation in public opinions regarding what the best 
interest among different interests of the whole community is and how this can be 
achieved; what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the 
goals of such development. For short, good governance in this aspect ensures that 
political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that 
the voices of the poorest, the views of minorities and the most vulnerable are taken into 
account in decision-making over the allocation of development resources. 
Equity and inclusiveness 
This aspect implies that all members of society, particularly the most vulnerable group, 
should share the same opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. This also 
means that no one should feel excluded from the mainstream of society.  
Effectiveness and efficiency 
The concept of effectiveness and efficiency in good governance context covers: 1/ the 
ability of institutions to produce results that meet the needs of society while making the 
best use of resources at their disposal; and 2/ the sustainable use of natural resources and 
the protection of the environment.  
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The afore-mentioned characteristics of good governance are interrelated, mutually 
reinforcing and cannot stand alone but are intertwined. For instance, accessible 
information means more transparency, broader participation and more effective decision-
making. Broad participation contributes both to the exchange of information needed for 
effective decision-making and for the legitimacy of those decisions. Legitimacy, in turn, 
means effective implementation and encourages further participation. And responsive 
institutions must be transparent and function according to the rule of law if they are to be 
equitable. These characteristics of good governance, especially accountability, 
transparency and rule of laws, in addition, imply that corruption must be minimized or 
even absent in governance in order to secure the efficiency of governance.   
The characteristics of good governance as presented above are an ideal model which is 
difficult to achieve in its totality. As UN ESCAP stated, very few countries and societies 
have come close to achieving good governance in its totality. However, to ensure 
sustainable human development, actions must be taken to work towards this ideal model 
with the aim of making it a reality. For us, this kind of ideal is drawn from a democratic 
and western way of thinking and the present picture of governance in both Kenya and 
Kibera is far from reaching such an ideal. However, we do find them interesting to be 
introduced to Kibera because it’s possible for Kibera to learn from this ideal model to 
improve its current governance system. For that reason, we will base on this model to 
examine the existing water governance in Kibera.  
2.2. Water governance 
Water, both as a scarce natural source and good, has been managed controlled by all 
societal entities, involving social and political interference in different ways. Since the 
Dublin conference in 1992, significant international goals have been set that relate to 
water governance. At the 2000 World Water Forum in The Hague, the Global Water 
Partnership Framework for Action (GWP, 2000) stated that the water crisis is often a 
crisis of governance. What is water governance actually about?  
By Global Water Partnership (GWP) 2003’s definition, “water governance refers to the 
range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to 
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develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different 
levels of society”. In accordance with this definition, water governance is the framework 
of political, social, economic and legal structures within which societies choose and 
accept to manage their water-related affairs. It includes governments, the market forces 
that help to allocate resources, and any other mechanism that regulates human 
interactions. 
According to Rogers and Hall, the concept of water governance consists of the legislative 
and institutional capacities for the purposes of public policies and institutional 
frameworks designing. It is concerned with those political, social and economic 
organisations and institutions (and their relationships), which are important for water 
development and management; with the functions, balances and structures internal to the 
water sector (internal governance); and with the framing of social agreements on property 
rights and the structure to administer and enforce them known as the law. Even though 
governance overlaps with the technical and economic aspects of water, it “points us to the 
political and administrative elements of solving a problem or exploiting an opportunity” 
(Rogers and Hall 2003, p.18). 
As we can see from the two definitions, that by Global Water Partnership (GWP) and that 
by Rogers and Hall differ slightly from each other when the former uses the term 
“systems” or “structures” and the latter applies “capacities”. Also, they cover a large 
spectrum of aspects relating to water. We, however, are of the opinion that water 
governance is the ongoing process of extracting, distributing and using water created by 
the actors’ purposeful actions within the present institutions. Here the term “actors” is 
understood as the “purposive entities designed by their creators to/that maximise the 
wealth, income or other objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the 
institutional structure of society” (North 1990, p.73), and “institutions” are “the rules of 
the games in society” (North, p.3 – this “institutions” concept will be discussed further in 
the next sub-section about institutions). This understanding of water governance will also 
be the one applied throughout the project, most focused in Chapter 4 when we describe 
the water governance structure in Kibera. 
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2.3. Institutions  
Grasping concept of institutions is an indispensable task of this study because examining 
and analysing the water governance problems also means to examine and analyse the 
institutions, or the governance structure, within the water sector. As Rogers and Hall 
stated, “one of the key tasks of governance is to create a framework (institutional and 
administrative) within which strangers or people with different interests can peacefully 
discuss and agree to cooperate and coordinate their actions” (Rogers and Hall 2003, p. 
20); and “water governance is concerned with those political, social and economic 
organisations and institutions (and their relationships), which are important for water 
development and management” (Rogers and Hall 2003, p. 16). Added to this is Shaleth 
and Dinar’s opinions that “the crisis in the water sector has also revealed the inherent 
limitations of today’s institutions in dealing effectively with the new set of problems 
related more to resource allocation and management than to resource development” 
(Shaleth and Dinar, 2004: 11). How should institutions be understood, then? 
Definitions of this concept vary considerably, in line with our findings. The definitions 
also differ from how they are interpreted and applied in everyday use where institutions 
often refers to entities as ministries, departments, societies, associations, unions, etc. 
hereby called “organisations” (institutional settings).  
In accordance with North’s theory, whose approach of institutions bases on degree of 
formality, institutions “are the rules of the games in a society, or more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. (North 1990, p. 3) The 
constraints can be both formal (such as the written laws or rules that human beings devise) 
and informal (such as conventions and codes of behaviour), and they “include both what 
individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some 
individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities” (North 1990, p.4). In other 
words, constraints should be understood as the framework within which human 
interactions take place.  
Institutions in North’s theory encompass formal written rules and informal rules. The 
former is made up of constitutions, laws, property rights, charters, by-laws, statute and 
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common law, regulations and enforcement characteristics whereas the latter is composed 
of extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formal rules; socially sanctioned norms 
of behaviour (customs, taboos and traditions); and internally enforced standards of 
conduct29. Institutions in the Kibera context are in fact about “rules of the games in 
society”, and we will use this definition to analyse institutions in Kibera in Chapter 4.  
Scott divided institutions into three pillars: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
(Scott 2001).  
The three pillars of institutions by Scott are summarised as in the Table below: 
Dimensions Institutions 
 Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-Granted, 
Share understanding 
Basis of order Regulative rules  Constitutive schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, Laws, 
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation 
 
Common beliefs, 
Shared logics of 
action 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned 
 
Morally governed 
 
Comprehensible, 
Recognisable, 
Culturally-
supported 
Source: Scott 2001, p.52 
According to us, there are two basic distinctions in the concept of institutions: 
organizations (as a form of institutional settings where rules are produced) and 
institutions (as rules of the game). Organizations can be formal (formal institutional 
                                                 
29 Johannes Jütting (2003), Institutions and Development: a Critical Review, Working Paper No. 210, 
OECD Development Centre: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/63/4536968.pdf 
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setting) and informal (informal institutional setting). Formal organisations are those 
adopted by authorised organisations and these organisations’ sanction violations, whereas 
informal organisations are those developed in the ongoing interaction of actors that 
reduce uncertainty in their interaction. Both organisations and institutions will be adopted 
in our empirical analysis. Furthermore, in accordance with the characteristics of Scott’s 
pillars of institutions, the regulative institution is the one relevant for water governance in 
Kibera and we will employ it in the empirical analysis, too.  
In the context of this project, there is a kind of group which doesn’t seem to be included 
in the institutional theory: gangs. Gangs are not a kind of recognised organisation. They 
are just a type of groups self-gathered by some people sharing the same purpose of doing 
illegal things, mainly. However, they have their own organisation, law (“the law of the 
jungle” as it is called) and rules of operation, operation facilities and equipment, and are 
able to influence the implementation process of water governance in Kibera. Based on 
our understanding of institutions, we do think that a gang is a kind of informal 
organisation and hereby define the gangs in Kibera as informal organisations.  
2.4. Public-Private Partnership 
The expression of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) gained popularity from the beginning 
of the eighties, initially within the context of a number of spectacular examples of new 
form of cooperation in the field of urban renewal. As Kooiman addressed in his 
governance theory, PPP is a form of interaction with the government or a mode of co-
governance. PPPs in general “suit governing situation where public-private parties 
cooperate in governing interplays to reach a win-win outcome, by exploiting mutually 
available resources” (Kooiman 2003, p. 103).  
Vincent Kouwenhoven seems to share with Kooiman by stating that “Public private 
partnership is a specific form of social-political governance, which has been of great 
interest for some years” (Vincent Kouwenhoven 2003). According to him, the definition 
of PPP should be taken into account both in a narrow and broad sense. In the narrow 
sense, PPP refers to legally formalised forms of cooperation between public and private 
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parties (join-ventures), whereas PPP in the broad sense also composes of less formalised 
consultative platform ((Vincent Kouwenhoven 2003).  
Aside from Kooiman and Vincent Kouwenhoven, there have been a variety of other 
definitions of PPP, and from what we have read, there’s no single complete definition of 
this concept. In line with our understanding, PPP is “a specific form of social-political 
governance” as Vincent Kouwenhoven stated, or a kind of cooperative relationship 
between the public and the private sectors, to be more understandable. This relationship 
is specifically for the cooperative provision of public infrastructure and services, among 
which are water and sanitation. It’s a kind of formal cooperation supposed to harmonise 
the strengths and weaknesses of the two sectors so that the maximum use is made of the 
strengths, while minimizing the potential for inefficiency caused by the weaknesses. In 
this respect, the two sectors are going to not only share profits but also any possible risks 
that may come up.  
2.4.1. Types of Public-Private Partnership 
There are many types of PPP, both in theory and in practice. Below are some examples of 
PPP arrangements:  
i. Build-Own-Operate (BOO): arrangements where the government contracts to 
purchase services from the private sector;  
ii. Build-Develop-Operate (BDO): arrangements where an element of private sector 
ownership is introduced into state owned enterprises through the creation of joint 
ventures or non-profit distributing entities;  
iii. Design-Build-Operate (DBO): arrangements where the private sector is utilised to 
exploit the commercial potential of government assets; and  
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iv. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT): arrangements where the public and private sectors 
work together to bring about more general policy outcomes30.  
The type of PPP in this project is BOT where the public and private sectors work together 
to bring about more general water policy outcomes. We will return to PPP with a 
concrete analysis in Chapter 5.  
2.4.2. Characteristics of Public-Private Partnership 
Our search from different sources and our understanding of PPP leads to a conclusion 
that no matter what kind of PPP it is and how it is structured or organised; it 
fundamentally has the following main characteristics: 
i. It brings together representatives from the public sector and representatives from 
the private sector around shared goals.  
ii. Each partner contributes time, money, expertise, or other relevant resources to the 
partnership. 
iii.   Partners work together toward common goals or objectives based on mutual 
understanding, respect and trust. 
iv. Decision-making and management responsibilities are shared among the partners.  
v. The implementation of PPP should be carried out in accordance with some 
important sound principles, which are transparency, accountability, legitimacy and 
legality, equity, inclusiveness, and competition – the principles similar to good 
governance already mentioned in sub-section 2.2, except competition. This is to 
promote a sustainable solution and to ensure public-private partnerships are 
                                                 
30 The Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, Review of Opportunities for Public 
Private Partnerships in Northern Ireland, Working Group Report, 
http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/ppp/mainreport/publicprivate.htm (Accessed on the 11th of April, 2005) 
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working to the benefit of all citizens31. Competition in this context helps to keep 
costs low and ensures that services respond to customer requirements. It encourages 
those involved to set lower prices and offer good value for money – to provide good 
services efficiently. In the absence of any competition, many of the benefits of PPPs 
are threatened. 
In the Analysis of PPP between NWC and MBK, we will base on the afore-mentioned 
characteristics of PPP, especially the principles of this relationship.  
2.5. Relations among the theories 
The different theories we have analysed and decided to use in this study have some 
relations to one another. These inter-relations can be illustrated in the chart below: 
 
Compiled by Group 2249 
The two different kinds of arrows demonstrate two different interpretations of the 
theories: the clear one is in accordance what has been discussed by theorists, and the 
dotted one is in accordance with our arguments of the theories with reference to the 
specific context of Kenya and Kibera.  
                                                 
31 UNDP in Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment (PPPUE): 
http://pppue.undp.org/toolkit/MOD082.html 
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Governance relates to water governance and Public-Private Partnership in the sense that 
water governance and Public-Private Partnership are sub-categories of governance. It 
inter-relates to the institutional theory because it concerns with the interactions among 
formal and informal organisations (public vis-à-vis private, civil society and individuals), 
hereby entailing Public-Private Partnership, too.  
Institutions relate to governance, water governance, and Public-Private Partnership. 
Institutions, as the rules of the games in society, craft order and reshape incentives, 
thereby building the governance structure of society and leading to the building of 
specific organisations like the local or national government, state agencies, Non-
Governmental Organisations, etc. Institutions, as organisations, are the indispensable 
contexts of water governance whereby Public-Private Partnership is one of the 
alternatives for the efficient management and distribution of water.  
Corruption, in principle, is not a factor covered in governance, water governance, 
institutions and Public-Private Partnership theories. However, in the case of Kenya 
generally and Kibera particularly, corruption has been an element interfering and 
overwhelming in the governance structure and other related aspects. Therefore, we argue 
that the absence of corruption is one of the pre-conditions of high importance for 
good/efficient governance, water governance, institutions and Public-Private Partnerships.  
2.6. Summary 
This Chapter has presented: 
i. A theoretical and conceptual discussion of the five major concepts applied throughout 
the project: governance, corruption, water governance, institutions, Public-Private 
Partnership and its characteristics; and 
ii. Main characteristics of good governance and the relations among governance, 
corruption, water governance, institutions and Public-Private Partnership. 
In the next Chapter, we will continue with a concise overview of water governance at 
international and Kenyan levels.  
 35 
CHAPTER 3. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL 
AND NATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
This chapter deals with water governance from global to national perspectives. The 
Dublin principles for water and dialogues on effective water governance set the stage for 
an insight into Kenya in general and Kibera in particular. In this chapter, we will examine 
the institutions, the water pricing, the political perspective as well as the legal and 
regulatory framework in Kenya. The examination is the basis for analysing the area of 
our study – Kibera – later on, due to the fact that all the mentioned aspects are quite 
similar at national and local levels.  
3.1. Global water governance  
3.1.1. The Dublin Principles for water  
The Dublin Principles for water management at local, national and global levels were 
established at the closing session of the International Conference on Water and 
Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland held from the 26th to the 31st of January, 1992. 
The context of the conference was that participants from 180 countries and organisations 
came to realise that the sustainable development and protection of environment was 
gravely and increasingly threatened by the scarcity and misuse of freshwater; and such 
vital aspects as human health, food security, industrial development and the ecosystems 
were totally at risk if the management of water and land resources wouldn’t be 
implemented more efficiently. The Dublin Principles were accordingly an attempt to 
concisely state the main issues and thrust of water management. The brief content of the 
Dublin Principles, regarded as the fundamental and important guidelines for the 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) that approaches water management 
from a holistic and sustainable standpoint, are as follows: 
Principle 1: Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment. 
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Principle 2: Water development and management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels. 
Principle 3: Women play a central role in the provision, management and safeguarding 
of water. 
Principle 4: Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognised as an economic good
32
. 
Principles 2, 3 and 4 are of particular interest for this project because of three reasons. 
Firstly, Principle 2 refers to the participation of the policy-makers, the public and private 
sectors, the civil citizens or the users from central to grassroots levels in water 
development and management. This principle is consequently a crucial point for defining 
the transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, responsiveness, sustainability and 
efficiency in water legislation and institutions. Secondly, Principle 3 relates to the central 
role of women in supplying, managing and safeguarding water is one of the factors that 
we will touch upon when describing and analysing the water provision structure in 
Kibera, thereby using it in our recommendations for involving women as such in the 
management and development of water.  
Thirdly, Principle 4 implies the value of water as an economic good, which should 
contribute to: 1/ changing the way that PWVs in Kibera have thought of water as a ”free” 
resource and they thus don’t have to pay for it but steal it from NWC instead33; and 2/ 
making PWVs stop connecting water illegally from NWC and pay for the water they get. 
The affirmation that water is an economic good is also a good base for the awareness and 
understanding of water rights, water charging, and the importance and effect of PPP in 
water provision in Kibera. As stated under this principle, “managing water as an 
economic good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of 
encouraging conservation and protection of water resources”.  
3.1.2. The dialogue on effective water governance  
                                                 
32 http://www.gwpforum.org/servlet/PSP?iNodeID=1345 (accessed April, 2005) 
33 Interview with technical director of Nairobi Water Company, January 2005.  
 37 
The Framework for Action (GWP, March 2000) presented at the 2nd World Water Forum 
in The Hague stressed that the water crisis is mainly a crisis of governance. Following 
that forum, the GWP established the Dialogue on Effective Water Governance in 
partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) with the aim of 
bringing stakeholders together to examine political processes and governance systems 
and provide a platform for communication, negotiation, social learning, and collective 
decision making. It helps build trust among the participants and promote information 
exchange for purposes of:  
i. Fostering communication between politicians and other decision makers, water 
managers and users in an effort to address water governance in several countries;  
ii. Highlighting good practices and lessons learned in implementing Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM) and, based on examples drawn from case 
studies, illustrate progress on improving water governance and water development 
and management;  
iii. Demonstrating IWRM as a practical process by using tools in the IWRM ToolBox; 
and 
iv. Identifying follow-up actions34 
The dialogue is centred on four themes:  
1. To create the enabling environment - the role of governments in establishing and 
enforcing appropriate water policies, laws and regulatory frameworks;  
2. To develop appropriate institutions - setting up the appropriate institutional structures 
at the river basin and aquifer level; 
3. To apply the management instruments - water regulation, valuing and pricing water, 
water rights;  
                                                 
34 Global Water Partnership: http://www.gwpforum.org/servlet/PSP?iNodeID=1730 
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4. To deal with political economy of water governance - conflict resolution, trans-
boundary issues, and managing social change35. 
Within the framework of the dialogue, it’s recognised that there is no single model of 
effective water governance because to be effective, the systems must fit the political, 
social, economic and cultural particularities of each country. The dialogue’s activities 
include holding political roundtables, assessing governance systems, applying lessons, 
and identifying good practices. The dialogue was accepted as a Type II partnership at the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 36 and has involved the 
participation of over 30 countries and 6 regions from Central America, South America, 
Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, West Africa, Eastern Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific, Southeast Asia and China. Kenya was among the representative 
participants from Eastern Africa.  
The dialogue on effective water governance is interesting for this project because here, 
distributed governance in water becomes a focused issue for discussion, providing a link 
to governance in society at large and to integrated water resources management. 
Participation strengthened most dialogues: bringing in more stakeholders such as civil 
society, private sector and individuals, making their different roles effective and getting 
action through partnerships. There was a general agreement that ‘what is required is to 
make distributed governance effective’, as stated in the Southeast Asian regional dialogue. 
It became clear that the governance of water resources and water services would function 
more effectively with an open social structure which enables broader participation by 
civil society, private enterprises and the media, all networking to support and influence 
government. Furthermore, examining the role of distributed governance helps to 
overcome the sterile discussion about private versus public water service delivery and the 
role of the community.  
3.2. Water governance in Kenya  
                                                 
35 Global Water Partnership: http://www.gwpforum.org/servlet/PSP?iNodeID=1730 
36 Global Water Partnership (2002), Effective water governance: learning from the dialogues: 
http://www.gwpforum.org/gwp/library/Effective%20Water%20Governance.pdf 
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3.2.1. Regulative institutions  
Water supply in Kenya is a major task that the government has been trying to streamline 
since independence from Britain in 1962. This can be evidenced by the creation of the 
Ministry of Water Resources Development and Management to oversee this important 
task. Research has already shown that the Ministry of Water’s initial policy of 
encouraging water projects on self-help basis in which local communities took control 
was unsuccessful.37 Alternative initiatives of streamlining water supply have seen the 
legislation of the Water Act 2002, after a series of other water-related government 
publications such as the National Policy on Water Resources Management and 
Development Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1999;  the Country Strategy on Water and 
Sanitation Services; and the Country Strategy on Integrated Water Resource 
Management. Of these, the Water Act 2002 is the latest and most important as far as 
water supply is concerned because it integrates important concepts from the other 
documents.  this paper, we shall examine important aspects of the Water Act 2002 only. 
The Water Act is an umbrella Act for the management of water resources. It is concerned 
with provision of water services and was drafted with the main goal of ensuring and 
assuring sustainable management and access to adequate water supply and sewerage by 
the population. It seeks to reform the water sector in the Kenya and introduce drastic 
changes in the management and service delivery of water resources. Moreover, it 
provides for: 
• Community participation in both the management of the resources and 
development. This is done through the establishment of Water Resources Users 
Associations that will serve as for a for conflict resolution. The act also advocates 
for co-operative management of the resource in catchment areas. 
• Establishment of a Water Appeals Board – an independent body empowered to 
resolve disputes between holders of water rights and the others. 
                                                 
37 http://www.boell.de/downloads/global/Water%20Privatisation%20in%20Kenya.pdf  
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• The establishment of a Water Resources Trust Fund to be managed by Trustees to 
cater for the extension of water services to all poor communities. 
3.2.2. Organisations  
In aspects of water governance in Kenya and by extension, Kibera, there are some main 
actors directly involved in the governance structure: Ministry of Water Resources 
Management and Development, Ministry of Local Authorities, the Water Resources 
Management Authority, the Water Services Regulatory Board, Departments of Water and 
Sanitation, the General Manager to the Water and Sewerage Committee, the 
Municipalities, and Water Undertakers (or the Local Authorities). The chart below will 
demonstrate these organisations of water governance in Kenya: 
 
 
 
Compiled by Group 2249  
Ministry of Local Authorities 
Water Services Regulatory Board 
Ministry of Water Resources 
Management and Development 
 
Departments of Water and Sanitation 
Water and Sewerage Committee (the 
General Manager) 
Municipalities 
Water Undertakers (the Local 
Authorities) 
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Rights and responsibilities of these institutions are as follows: 
a. Ministry of Water Resources Management and Development: is the one of the highest 
authority, responsible for all water resources in the country, their utilization and 
conservation. The Water Resources Management Authority is supposed to have regional 
offices at water catchments level for decentralized decision making. The aim is to ensure 
quick response to water resources management problems and to speed water allocation 
process along the river basin equitably.  
b. Ministry of Local Authorities is the one of the highest authority, plays a facilitative and 
regulatory role, arranging necessary technical interventions with the Ministry of Water 
Resources Management and Development. 
c. The Water Services Regulatory Board is the body responsible for the regulation of 
water and sewerage including maintenance of quality, standards and issuance of licenses 
for service provision. This body also takes care of issuing licenses to regional water 
services boards, in charge of water supply in their areas of jurisdiction. 
d. Departments of Water and Sanitation are those taking care of the operations of water 
under the guidance of the Water Act, the Local Government Act, and the guidelines and 
regulations provided by the Water by-laws.  
e. The General Manager to the Water and Sewerage Committee is responsible for 
submitting all water functional matters in form of proposals to the elected councillors for 
consideration. Decisions made by the councillors will be forwarded to a committee called 
the Finance Committee for being previewed. Finally, the proposals will be approved by 
the entire council, who meets only once per month.  
f. The Municipalities are empowered to issue by-laws related to the provision of water 
and sewerage services in their own jurisdiction. They act in liaison with the Urban 
Development Department of Ministry of Local Authorities in order to make the Local 
Authorities function as Water Undertakers.   
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g. Water Undertakers are the Local Authorities, whose water-undertaking function is 
activated via the assistance of the Municipalities. In 1997, there were 147 gazetted urban 
areas with 30% of them under local authority appointed water undertakers. Some local 
authorities run and maintain their water and sanitation facilities (e.g. Nairobi, Eldoret, 
Kericho, Nyeri). Some receive water in bulk from National Water Conservation and 
Pipeline Corporation and run sewerage services while others are dependent on the 
National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation for provision of water and 
revenue collection for water and sewerage services38. 
Aside from the actors mentioned above, there are other four entities involved: The 
National Environmental Management Authority, The National Water Conservation and 
Pipeline Corporation, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Ministry of Public 
Health. The fact that these entities with their different functions, rights and 
responsibilities are involved in the water governance organisation in Kibera has caused 
some conflicts in terms of roles. Why so? 
When three ministries and three parastatals,  have an aspect or two relating to water in 
Kenya, that is a recipe for chaos and conflicts. It results in buck-passing whenever there 
are water related problems. For example, in the ongoing water clashes Maai Mahiu, the 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, and the Ministry of Water Resource 
Management and Development have been laying blame on each other for the reduced 
water volumes due to surface cover depletion in water catchment areas. This scenario is 
also confusing not only for water consumers but also for water vendors who are bogged 
down by unnecessary bureaucratic ‘harassment’. 
Though not directly involved, officers from the Ministry of Public Health are expected to 
routinely inspect the quality of water consumed by the public. Though they hardly ever 
do that except during instances of water-borne epidemic outbreaks, there are always 
‘officers’ claiming to be from one ministry or the other - all intent on ‘prosecuting’  
erring water sellers unless, of course, they are given some money. If someone is arrested 
                                                 
38 Joseph Oginga Onjala (2002), Good Intentions, Structural Pitfalls: Early Lessons from Urban Water 
Commercialisation Attempts in Kenya, CDR Working Paper 02.2, Denmark 
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for an illegal connection and is taken to court, the integrity of the legal and justice system 
will then come to the fore.  
3.2.3. Political Perspectives  
The interaction between water and politics – (defined here as the process through which 
relations of power are constituted, negotiated and, reproduced39) - has been noted as an 
important aspect in the improvement of water provision services. This is because almost 
all decisions that pertain to water policy issues are made by politicians.  
In Kenya, this role is vested in the Minister for Water Resources Management and 
Development. The Minister, Martha Karua, thinks that water provision problems persist 
because of the ‘minimal financial support to water resources management’, and states 
that ‘water resources management has been relegated to the periphery in financial 
resource allocation and prioritization’40 Though it is not clear how an increased budget 
for the ministry will solve the water problems in places like Kibera, it is important to note 
that for the 4 years she has held the water portfolio, no bill has been drafted and presented 
to parliament by her ministry in an effort to remedy the financial under-allocation. This 
apathy seems to be common amongst Kenya politicians.  
The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources is also concerned about protection 
and conservation of water due to its classification as a natural resource. The body politic 
has also created the National Environmental Management Agency, which is concerned 
with water resources management, and Institutional/Capacity Building. According to the 
National Environmental Management Agency, its Water Resources Management 
programmes41 include:  
• Survey and gazettement of water catchment areas, aquifers and recharge areas  
• Establishment of cadastral information system for all water bodies and sources  
                                                 
39 World Water Council available at http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/water_politics/workshop.shtml 
40Everyone Lives Downstream, ITDG, available at: 
http://www.itdg.org/home_text.asp?id=kit_aug_03_joint_water  
41 http://www.nema.go.ke/water_resources3.htm  
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• Monitoring of water conservation activities and regulation for public and privately 
operated water utilities  
• Establishment of effective surface water flow measurement and groundwater 
monitoring systems  
• Collection of water quality and pollution data on all water bodies  
• Enforcement of the Water Act.  
• Regulation of the ecosystem management and environmental flows (reserve) in 
water management  
• Strengthening the water regulatory boards  
• Broad based water quality management and pollution control that emphasis 
control and management of both point sources (from industries and municipal 
waste water discharges) and non point sources (from agrochemical mining, 
human settlements etc)  
• Formulation of a national sanitation policy  
 The National Environmental Management Agency’s Institutional/Capacity Building 
programmes42 include:  
• Creating public awareness on conservation of water catchments areas 
• Training of farmers on irrigation water management  
• Improvement of the existing water resource quality and quantity database.  
• Local rain water harvesting  
• Legal and institutional reforms  
                                                 
42 Ibid 
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• Establishment of “Water User Associations” in Arid and Semi-Arid Locations 
areas  
• Establishment of  a “Water Sector Trust Fund”  
• Public awareness and sensitization campaigns on the soil and vegetation cover on 
water catchments areas via media farmer field days and demonstration sites  
• Promotion and capacity building in water harvesting techniques  
Another parastatal created by the government that is directly concerned with water is the 
National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation. As its name implies, 
conservation of water is the main obligation of this entity. It also has water reservoirs and 
is involved in selling water in bulk to municipal and local councils. The Ministry of 
Public Health’s officers are expected to ensure that water consumed by the public is of 
good quality. 
The above five examples serve to show that politicians are interested in solving water 
problems even though it involves the ad hoc creation of institutions whose roles may 
overlap and clash causing confusion. Later on in this paper, we examine this aspect 
further. 
 3.2.4. Water Pricing  
Like elsewhere, the object of water pricing in Kenya is intended to mitigate water 
scarcity, meet cost of delivery related expenses, and also raise fees necessary for further 
water infra-structure development. The logic is that, if you charge people for water, they 
will be inclined to spend less of the commodity. It follows then that as water prices rise, 
less of the commodity is used until equilibrium is reached whereby the minimum water 
requirement has to be purchased even though one has to spend a little more. This of 
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course, is idealistic. Water pricing then becomes an important policy instrument for 
creating incentives to conserve and allocate water efficiently.43 
Until the signing of the Water Act 2002, water prices were determined by the central 
government. However, under current regulations, water pricing is the prerogative of the 
water companies tendered by municipal and county councils to run water and sanitation 
services. It is upon these companies to determine cost recovery water prices. Because of 
the decentralization of water pricing, the price for water in Kisumu city for example is 
much lower than in Nairobi and Mombasa.  
In Kenya, water is sold mostly to urban dwellers, who rely on piped water for their 
domestic requirements. There are a few rural households also served by piped water. 
Contingent valuation studies have shown that the value of piped water connections, under 
varying initial charge payment profiles, particularly initial connection charge profiles, 
determine to a large extent, decisions by households to connect to piped water. (See 
Wasike W.S.K., the Pricing of Domestic Water Services in Developing Countries: a 
Contingent Valuation Application to Kenya.44) 
The average price for a 20 litre container of water in Kenya is 0.65 shillings (KES13 = 
DKK 1). 
Despite the noble and necessary intentions of putting a price tag on water as an economic 
good, it is evident that this strategy is not working in Kenya due to a myriad of 
governance problems as we shall discuss in the next chapter. 
3.3. Summary 
This Chapter has presented the water governance perspectives at global and national 
levels where we briefly reviewed the Dublin Principles for Water, the global dialogue on 
effective water governance, and the existing water governance system in Kenya. All these 
perspectives provide us with a good foundation to move ahead to the follow-up chapters 
                                                 
43 Water Pricing: Potential Pitfalls available at http://www.wca-
infonet.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0xMjUxLjExMTU0Jjc9ZW4mNjE9ZG9jdW1lbnRzJjY1PWluZ
m8~#koinfo  
44 For details see http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/carfax/cijw/1998/00000014/00000001/art00003   
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when we discuss and analyse the water governance problems in Kibera – our area of 
study.  
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS OF THE WATER GOVERNANCE 
IN KIBERA 
4.1. Institutions  
4.1.1. Regulative institutions – formal rules of the games 
4.1.1.1. Non-implementation of the water law 
Unlike many other countries in the world, the legal and regulatory system in Kenya is the 
same for all localities, namely all such legal documents as the Water Act 2002, as the 
National Policy on Water Resources Management and Development Sessional Paper No. 
1 of 1999;  the Country Strategy on Water and Sanitation Services; and the Country 
Strategy on Integrated Water Resource Management mentioned in sub-chapter 2 about 
the legal and regulatory framework in Kenya, are applicable for Nairobi and Kibera, too. 
Aside from those documents, there are no local regulations to match the very particular 
situation in either Nairobi or Kibera.  
Under the application of the Water Act 2002, regarded as “an Act of Parliament to 
provide for the management, conservation, use and control over water resources and for 
the acquisition and regulations of rights to use water; to provide for the regulation and 
management of water supply and sewerage services; to repeal the Water Act (Cap.372) 
and certain provisions of the Local Government Act; for related purposes” 45 , the 
ownership, the right to use water and the acquisition of water rights are clearly stated as 
follows: 
Ownership: Every water source is vested in the State, namely water is a public good46; 
Right to use water: This right is vested in the Minister, except to the extent that it is 
alienated by or under the Water Act 2002 or any other written law; 
                                                 
45 The Water Act 2002, p.940.  
46 Definition of this concept provided in sub-section 1.7. 
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Acquisition of water rights: after the commencement of the Water Act 2002, no 
conveyance, lease or other instrument shall be effectual to convey, assure, demise, 
transfer or vest in any person any property right or any interest or privilege, right, interest 
or privilege shall be acquired other than under the Water Act 2002.  
Nevertheless, in reality, water has been illegally transferred to be a kind of private good47 
and sold on the market uncontrollably. The Minister has not been reported and taken 
action within his power and duties, neither has the Nairobi City Council been able to 
tackle this serious matter. Moreover, the police have not been involved in handling the 
water crimes. That is, the State has lost a lot of water, and the innocent consumers have 
suffered from exorbitant prices as mentioned above. The Water Act 2002 all in all just 
something exists on paper. It’s not respected nor complied with.  
4.1.1.2. A compromised legal and justice system  
The only way open, if the residents of Kibera were to benefit from affordable and 
sufficient water from the NWC, would be for tough legal action on the cartel that is 
fleecing them. Police officers are in charge of making arrests after a crime has been 
reported. In Kenya, however, people hardly report crimes unless related to actual bodily 
harm or one is threatened, or robbed. This is because, according to Transparency 
International, “people who deal with the police pay 10.5 bribes per person per month on 
average, which translates into 6.7 bribes 'per capita', making police officers the most 
frequently bribed public employees in Kenya.
48
” 
It is almost normal that when one wants to report a crime, s/he has to have some money 
with which to bribe a police officer so that the crime is investigated. Once the perpetrator 
of the crime is arrested, the officers will demand a bribe threatening to take him to court 
if s/he doesn’t pay up. Many offenders prefer to bribe the police officers rather than go to 
court. Not because they fear being imprisoned but because, the bribes demanded by 
magistrates and judges are much higher than those demanded by police officers. 
                                                 
47 Definition of this concept provided in sub-section 1.7. 
48 Quoted in Kenya’s Long Slide into Mass Graft, Available at 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=8741  
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In 2002 a Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Legal Experts, including two Canadians, 
after visiting Kenya warned that "the air is full of allegations of corruption, incompetence 
and inefficiency."49 
A formal investigation by Justice Aaron Ringera followed the warning and his optimistic 
report indicated that that 50% of judges and a third of magistrates take bribes. 
The Daily Nation, following the Ringera Report printed a "price list" it said was 
contained in an unpublished part of Judge Ringera's report, indicating it cost almost: 
US$200,000 to buy an Appeals Court Judge, up to US$20,000 for a High Court 
judge, and about US$3,000 for a magistrate. A favourable decision on a murder 
charge could set you back US$30,000, while manslaughter, rape or drug charges 
cost up to US$10,000.
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It is difficult in such a climate of corruption to conduct clean business even when it is in 
essential services like water.  
4.1.2. Organisations 
It’s important to include that in relation to Kibera, water governance involves many 
actors, such as the government, the public sector, the private sector, influential land lords, 
the Chief, the Village Elders, church leaders, lone-rangers, gangs, etc., which make the 
governance turn to be complex. All actors other than government and the public sector 
are grouped together as part of the "civil society", and in addition to the civil society, 
organized crime syndicates such as the gangs (defined as informal organisations in sub-
section 2.3.) are created and influence the water governance implementation process. 
Corruption, deriving from such a multi-actor background, is a “black thread”51 going 
through the whole institutional system. 
4.1.2.1. Formal organisations 
                                                 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
51 This expression implies that this is a bad phenomenon.  
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The formal organisations involved in the water sector in Nairobi generally and Kibera 
particularly include the Water Services and Management Authority, the Water Services 
Regulatory Board, the Nairobi Services Board, the Nairobi City Council (NCC) and the 
Nairobi Water Company (NWC). Rights and responsibilities of the Water Services and 
Management Authority, the Water Services Regulation Board are the same to those 
mentioned in the sub-section 3.2.1 (p.31) regarding organisation in Kenya. The additional 
fact to be given here is that the Water Services Regulatory Board has licensed the Nairobi 
Water Services Board to oversee the supply in the city, Thika and Kiambu municipal 
councils, Limuru, Lari, Kikuyu, Karuri, Ruiru and Olkejuado town councils, as well as 
the Export Processing Zones around Nairobi. The rights and responsibilities of the others 
are: 
The Nairobi Services Board: This organisation is charged with the responsibility of 
licensing water and service providers that operate within Nairobi and its environs. This 
board receives tender applications from interested water service providers, examines 
them before awarding the tender to the company they feel is most competent to roll out 
the water network in all the areas under its jurisdiction. The board also has powers to 
cancel licences for companies that fail to meet their stated water provision objectives. It 
was this institution who issued the Nairobi Water Company (NWC), which is owned by 
the Nairobi City Council (NCC), with a license to provide Nairobi residents with water. 
The Nairobi City Council (NCC): this organisation has the right and responsibility to 
issue by-laws related to the provision of water and sewerage services in their own 
jurisdiction. It acts in liaison with the Urban Development Department of Ministry of 
Local Authorities in order to make the Local Authorities function as Water Undertakers.  
Nairobi Water Company (NWC): is a Water Undertaker or a Local Authority. It is a 
subsidy of Nairobi City Council (NCC) but it has its own autonomy to operate its water 
affairs without interference. NWC has its own board of directors, offices with a managing 
director and bank account. It is responsible for its own revenue generations and 
utilization. 
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NWC fights against corruption 
Despite the different functions, rights and responsibilities, these five organisations are 
hierarchically related to one another, demonstrated as in the chart in the next page.  
4.1.2.2. Informal organisations 
The informal organisations, included in the chart below, are Maji Bora Kibera (MBK), 
“independent” water vendors or lone-rangers, Kibera citizens (water consumers). Apart 
from these organisations, there exist two others whose names are Kamjeshi (Nairobi 
urban slang for ‘small army’) and Mungiki.  
Maji Bora Kibera (MBK): is a private enterprise covering most of small scale Private 
Water Vendors (PWVs) operating in the Kibera slums. It has a membership of 1500 
registered water vendors but only 500 of them are active members. More details about 
this organization are presented under sub-section 5.2.  
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The Water Provision Structure in Kibera 
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“Independent” water vendors (lone-rangers): these lone-rangers operate outside MBK’s 
union as independent vendors. They exist in all over nine villages in Kibera, are 
unregistered and therefore impossible to get information about the number of lone-
rangers. Their main activity is to illegally connect water from NWC and then sell back to 
Kibera residents.  
Kamjeshi and Mungiki: these two gangs form the groups themselves depending on their 
location. Some villages are controlled by Kamjeshi while others are by Mungiki. The 
latter originally started out as a violent and aggressive religious cult that rejected Western 
culture (for more information visit http://www.rickross.com/groups/mungiki.html ). 
Mungiki are associated with the Kikuyu tribe while most members of Kamjeshi belong to 
the Luo tribe. These gangs originally fought violent and bloody turf wars over control of 
bus stops.  When a gang took control of a bus stop, each commuter taxi (popularly known 
as Matatu in Nairobi had to pay hashara (protection fee) in order to pick or drop off 
passengers. Over time, both gangs have diversified their business ventures and now 
demand ‘protection fee’ from water vendors. Water vendors who fail to pay this fee will 
have their water piping, taps and meter stolen. In most cases, the pipes, meter and taps are 
then resold back to the same vendor. Both gangs usually demand for KES 50 per day and 
this is easier to pay for vendors than risking losing pipes and water meters. (The water 
meter alone costs approximately KES 2,200.) 
Kibera residents or the water consumers: are the inhabitants living in Kibera and have the 
demand of using water for their daily activities. Here it is interesting to note that the 
central role the Dublin Principle No 3 accords women as providers, managers and 
guardians of water resources has not filtered down to Kibera. Despite the fact that women 
form the bulk of water consumers, very few are actively engaged in management of water 
as a resource. During our field work, we found no evidence that women are involved at 
any level of the decision making process. We found many women actively involved in 
water provision as water vendors. However, a large percentage of these women do not 
own the businesses but manage them on behalf of their husbands. A large percentage of 
MBK membership is composed of women. This numerical strength is however not 
reflected in the list of office-bearers, where all the officials are men. 
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Cultural taboos that define women as people to be led as opposed to people who can lead 
still persist despite awareness to the contrary. This has negatively imparted on their 
participation in water policy, water resources management and protection (despite the 
fact that, in response to the Dublin principles, the government of Kenya, has preserved 
the Ministry of Water Resources and Management docket to women Ministers).  
4.1.2.3. Interactions between formal and informal organisations – informal rules of the 
games 
The chart above reflects the relationship among the formal organisations and the 
interactions between NWC and the informal organisations. In the concrete context of our 
study, we will only cover the way that different actors behave in water supply in the 
shaded part because of its immediacy to Kibera. Corruption is herein the key term for the 
actors’ behaviour. This does not, in any way, imply that the organisational dynamics 
outside the shaded area are ‘clean’. We thus name the parts as Level A and Level B for 
the purposes of explanation only. 
From the structure, it’s important to note that: 
Level A 
i. The Cartel 
It is quite powerful and influential, composed of politicians, former employees of Nairobi 
City Council (NCC), former and current employees of Nairobi Water Company (NWC), 
and ‘independent’ water vendors. The cartel has ganged up to frustrate progressive 
elements within the NWC52. According a detailed investigative report53, this cartel tries to 
influence membership of NWC and many of its members are involved directly or 
indirectly in the Kibera water trade. The main interest of this cartel is to perpetuate the 
status quo of the existing water problems so that the financial gain it currently enjoys is 
not threatened. Due to the illegal nature of their business, this cartel, (be they middlemen 
                                                 
52 Who are Nairobi’s Water Thieves? – Nairobi’s Water Infamy,  Special Report, Daily Nation, Outlook 
Magazine,  Monday, January 31, 2005 pp 1 
53 Ibid 
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between NWC and the vendor, water vendors or NWS employees) manage to stay in 
business by bribing the provincial administration officers, public health officers, and 
water meter readers. The cartel ‘buys’ protection in NWC by bribing ‘friendly’ members 
of the board. The NWC board members, who are sympathetic to the cartel, then try to 
influence policy and decisions that would be beneficial to the cartel as a special 
investigative report reveals above. 
ii. The Board 
Composition of the board is described in 4.1.1 above.  But this board essentially makes 
decisions that determine water provision in Nairobi. Membership of the board is valuable 
because of the many ‘perks’ that come with it for those willing to use their positions to 
line their pockets from the cartel already mentioned above. 
iii. Provincial Administration officers, public health officers and water meter readers 
These usually target the independent water sellers. It is common knowledge that the 
water sold by the latter is not only stolen, but is of question quality. The independent 
water sellers therefore pay ‘protection money’ in order to engage in their business. 
Meter readers are paid ‘protection money’ by ‘independent’ water vendors and some 
members of MBK so that the later are able to hawk water that by-passes the meter. The 
meter readers are then able to allow and facilitate illegal water connections. 
The provincial administration officers in Kibera range from the local District Officer, the 
Chief, Assistant Chief, and Village Elders. Administration police officers located at the 
District Officer’s office in Kibera were reported to be collecting ‘fees’ for water from 
PWVs. The Secretary of MBK says that some members of MBK continue to pay ‘bills’ to 
the District Officer’s officer (see Interview with MBK in the Appendix). It is almost 
impossible to operate a water kiosk without permission from the Chief and Village Elders 
of Kibera. The permission to operate, even after flashing a licence, is not given freely but 
involves money changing hands. 
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Public health officials also routinely demand bribes in order to allow private water 
vendors to carry on their trade in unhygienic conditions. A bribe also ensures that the 
Public Health officers do not test the water quality which is mostly polluted. 
Level B 
At this level, there are MBK, ‘independent’ water vendors and Kibera residents. By 
‘independent’ water vendors, we mean the Kibera water vendors who have opted out of 
MBK membership. MBK and the ‘independent’ water vendors create artificial shortages 
and then hike water prices. Our interview with the technical director of NWC confirmed 
that the latter is aware of this practice but cites insecurity as a reason why they are 
reluctant to intervene. 
The lone-rangers are a thorn in the flesh for both MBK and NWC because they play the 
game according to their own rules – stealing water and selling water at whatever price 
they deem fit. Many are protected by either Kamjeshi or Mungiki. MBK feels that the 
independent PWVs create unhealthy competition because they sell stolen water and are 
therefore able to sell at lower prices. During our field work, however, we visited both 
MBK vendors and the lone-rangers and realized that there was no noticeable price 
difference. It seemed that whereas MBK members incur expenses paying bills to NWC, 
the lone-rangers might be spending similar amounts or even more paying protection fees. 
But they pose a complication in the water game because so long as they remain outside, 
MBK feels that it becomes difficulty for it to push its water agenda.  
The cost of corruption is passed on down the chain and finally heaped on the water 
consumer (Kibera residents) in terms of high water prices. In order to understand why 
Kibera is so popular with water cartels and PWVs, two points are important: 
i. The concentration of over 1 million people in a small area makes it attractive for 
entrepreneurs in need of selling an essential good to as many customers as 
possible. Nowhere else in Nairobi do we have such a huge concentration of 
potential customers as Kibera. 
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ii. The money is another important aspect. The customers are willing to buy water. If 
we assume that the water vendors sell a 20-litre container for only Kshs. 3, and 
assuming there are approximately 167,000 families in Kibera (we have already 
noted that the population is approximately 1 million with an average family size 
of 6). In our interviews with water consumers, it became evident that families 
need 120 litres of water per day for washing clothes, bathing, cooking, drinking 
and other related domestic chores. What it implies then is that in a day, water 
vendors make: 
 167,000 x 6 x 3 = KES 3,006,000 (1 KES = 13 DKK) 
 Assuming there are 2,000 water vendors, each water vendor will earn a monthly 
income of:  
 3,006,000 /2,000 = 1503 x 30 = 45,090 
Policemen usually demand bribes averaging KES 631 54 , according to Transparency 
International, while local government officials (including public health officers, 
provincial administration officers, water meter readers from NWC, and other NCC 
employees usually demand for KES 110 according to the same report.) Police officers 
had their pay doubled in 2004 and now earn KES 10,00055 
From the above figures, it should then be clear that the water vendors are capable of 
affording ‘protection’ from the police and other public servants. It should also be noted 
that a large number of water vendors are usually ‘proxies’ for a single cartel as reported 
in the Special Report already cited. This calculation also does not take into consideration 
the fact that some vendors have several retail points with varying tap outlet numbers. 
Therefore, some water vendors may make more than KES 150,000 per day, while others 
may go home with less than KES 500. 
To sum up the institutions: 
                                                 
54 Kenya’s List of Corruption Unveiled available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/2002/0118bribe.htm 
55 Huge Pay Rise for Kenya’s Police available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3419293.stm 
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i. The water users in Kibera are mostly women and children. They need safe water 
at the lowest possible price. Their only source of water presently is by buying this 
commodity from water vendors. The official law is without any relevance to them, 
for they lack the means to activate it. 
ii. Water vendors seek to make a living through the sale of water they obtain from 
NWC. Their aim is to make as much profit as possible. For them: 
a. Access to water is regulated by both formal and informal organisations. The formal 
organisations demand that water be metered and bills be paid regularly. Failure will 
result in NWC disconnecting the water. The public health office also demands that water 
sold be fit for human consumption. The sanction for violating this is that either the 
vendor must bribe the public health officer, or the police officers who come to arrest 
him/her (if the public health officer is not bribed). Informal organisations dictate that you 
can connect water illegally without metering if you pay the required kitu kidogo 
(‘something small’) to NWC officials and/or the local water gangs. Violation results in 
water disconnection (if a NWC official has not been bribed) or the theft of water pipes 
and taps (if the local gangs don’t get their money). 
NWC claims that the informal organisations control the water in Kibera and that attempts 
to sanction its use are violently repulsed by the gangs. Even though NWC is capable of 
disconnecting Kibera entirely in order to get a good bargaining position with the informal 
organisations, they haven’t done it, at least, not in their official capacity. 
b. Access to the market is regulated by both formal and informal organisations: 
o There is a formal organisation that requires a certificate from the NWC to operate. 
The sanction for breaking this organisation is legal prosecution. 
o Informal organisation s dictate that a vendor gets permission to operate by giving 
gangs, police officers, public health officials and village elders  ‘something small’. 
Officials from NWC, Public health officers, and the provincial administration officers 
seem to have one objective: to live “decently” as officials. Formal organisation dictates 
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against this illegal activity whose sanction can include dismissal, but the formal 
organisation is rarely implemented hence irrelevant. 
iii. The NWC Board: it is not clear how many members in the board support this 
formal organisation. Suffice to say that there are those in it for the purposes of 
utilizing their position to enrich themselves. Regulative institutions exist that are 
meant to limit misuse of their position but this organisation has implementation 
weaknesses. 
4.2. Economic instruments and financial flows 
4.2.1. Water charges 
Water in Kibera is undoubtedly a scarce commodity – an economic good which really has 
its valuation supposed to be defined in both the State law and the local regulations. In the 
Water Act 2002, the most important legal document of Kenya and Kibera, it’s stated that 
“the charges shall be determined by reference to a schedule of charges published in the 
Gazette from time to time by the Authority, with the approval of the Minister and 
following public consultation”.56 Reality reflects something different.  
As mentioned in the introduction, because of the fact that Kibera is an informal or illegal 
settlement, neither the national nor the local authorities have paid attention to providing 
Kibera residents with such basic services as water and sanitation. The main source of 
water that Kibera residents can get so far is from the water vendors, who take the 
advantage of the unfortunate situation to make them pay exorbitant prices even though 
99% of the water they sell to Kibera residents is illegally connected. Studies indicate that 
Kibera residents, who live on an average income of less than $1 per day, pay 5-20 times 
more for water than the average American citizen57  and 10-20 times more than Nairobi 
upper market estate dwellers. Our interview with the technical director of NWC also 
revealed that the prices of water that PWVs are selling are ten times more than those of 
the water they sell. As the IRC noted, “There are more than 1,400 registered water 
                                                 
56 The Water Act 2002, p.966. 
57 www.netwasgroup.com/newsletter/articles/2002/05/11 
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vendors in Kibera. They buy water for 0.65 Kenyan shillings for a 20-litre drum, but sell 
it for 3-10 Kenyan shillings, delivery extra”58.  
During the rainy season, when the water taps get clogged, the minimum prize for a 20-
litre container is 10 Kenyan shillings. As regards “public consultation” mentioned in the 
Water Act, neither NWC nor PWVs have ever consulted in the public opinions.  
A common answer from many water end-users when being asked what they thought 
about the water prices they had to pay was that it was too expensive. Water vendors are 
also aware that their prices are on the higher side. During one of our visits to Kisumu 
Ndogo village, we asked a water vendor how much she was selling a 20-litre container of 
water. She quoted a lower price than what she had been charging. The residents who 
were queuing for water demanded that she sells the water to them at the price she had 
quoted to us. There was a near riot when she became adamant that there would be no 
water price change. 
It can be concluded that the realisation of water pricing by PWVs in Kibera is not within 
any price framework. Since water here is an illegally-connected source, its prices are 
decided not by NCC or NWC but by the PWVs, who have no care for the poor lives but 
for how to make more and more profits from their water business only - an almost 
endless greed. Here the responsibility first and foremost belongs to NCC and NWC, who 
have floated the water prices. The technical director of NWC in his interview says his 
officers can’t go to Kibera because they “will be beaten up”, but it’s our impression that 
it is just an excuse that we shouldn’t believe (what’s the police force there for, then?). It’s 
also our doubt that he might be involved in the water cartels because our various visits to 
Kibera showed that NWC officers, in their personal capacity, do visit Kibera to help in 
the illegal connections and collect water fees on ‘behalf’ of NWC. The interview with 
MBK also confirmed the same fact.  
4.2.2. Fines, Subsidies and Taxes   
                                                 
58 Journalists Urged to draw political lessons from Water Stories available at: http://www.irc.nl/page/2560  
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Fines for misuse of the water source and subsidies from the state for water pricing are not 
stated in the water law. This responsibility is left to city, municipal and town councils. In 
their by-laws, amounts for various ‘water crimes’ are stated. These include tampering 
with metres, illegal connections, meter by-passes, etc. However, due to the culture of 
corruption that seems to permeate almost every sector and ministry department, hardly 
anybody ever gets prosecuted. 
Councils have powers to negotiate with state corporations such as the National Water and 
Pipeline Corporation for bulk water price subsidies. The benefits for the lower prices are 
then expected to be passed down to water consumers in terms of lower bills. 
Water taxes are included in water bills as Value Added Tax (VAT). Currently, every 
water consumer under most councils pay 16% VAT based on estimates of water 
consumed. 
4.2.3. Billing and metering system 
A major avenue for corruption and inefficiency lies in the billing and metering system 
inherited from the Nairobi City Council’s Department for Water and Sewerage Services. 
Many former and current water meter readers are involved in personal ‘revenue 
collection’ that goes into their private bank accounts. For example in August 2004, three 
employees of NWC opened a bank account in the name of Nairobi City Water Council 
Staff Self-Help Group. In one instance, in a single day, they managed to divert a cheque 
of Sh. 4,904,259.60 (DKK 372,000) meant for NWC into their account59. The cheque 
was for a water bill they had presented to Kenya Cooperative Creameries based in 
Dandora in Nairobi. The operation of water cartels have been described as: 
A highly complex operation that involves falsifying consumer bills, fixing illegal 
water connections, tampering with water meters and ensuring that cheques 
written in favour of NWC are diverted to individual accounts.
60
 
                                                 
59 Ibid pp 12 
60 Ibid pp 12 
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The Special Report already cited found out that Nairobi is divided into 5 zones, each 
controlled by and run by a different cartel. Kibera is believed to be the most ‘prosperous’. 
This is because the cartel in charge has almost effectively managed to shut out the official 
NWC from doing business in this area. It has managed to block most of the revenue that 
should accrue to the NWC by diverting it into private accounts as already mentioned.  
The report cites that some of the major players in the water vending business in Kibera 
are former and present employers of NWC.  From our interview with one of the water 
vendors (see Appendix ….. and Appendix …. pictures of Kibera) it became evident that 
the amounts involved in the business are colossal. The vendor said: 
On a bad day, I fill 30,000 vibuyus (20-litre jerry-cans) using all the six taps. My 
water is cheap… I charge only 5 shillings per kibuyu. So I don’t make much 
money like the sellers in Gatuikira and Kisumu Ndogo who charge 10 shillings 
express for everybody’ 
Even though the interviewee was cagey about the amount of money he makes on a good 
day, it is clear that on bad days, he makes Ksh. 150,000 (DKK 11.331). There are 1,500 
registered vendors, and an unknown number of ‘independent’ water sellers. It is unclear 
how much money they make because those interviewed declined to discuss the issue. It 
was evident too that not all water vendors make that much money. Some rely only on 
single tap outlets. Despite the fact that long queues will be seen here too, one wouldn’t 
expect them to compete with vendors with many taps. However, if the Lindi Mosque 
water seller is an indicator as to amounts of money raised by other ‘big’ vendors, it will 
then become clear that the water vending business is a multimillion shilling industry. 
Cartels involved in such a business will go to any lengths to protect their cash cow. 
Corruption has seen heightened illegal water connection activity as new entrants try to 
cash in on the water chaos. 
4.3. Participation 
Community participation, especially participation of women, as concerns water resource 
management at the local level is enshrined in the Water Act 2002. The Act provides for 
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the creation of Associations of Water Users that can deliberate important water resource 
issues such as pricing. In Kibera, community participation is minimal. No attempt has 
been made to encourage community participation in decision making as concerns water. 
During our field work, we realized that most Community-Based Organisations that claim 
to bring Kibera residents together for collective bargaining on water provision are 
essentially ‘brief-case’ organisations aimed at donor funding on the pretext of serving 
Kibera residents. Many had their offices locked and the residents had no idea about the 
activities of the Community-Based Organisations. Also, there are no organisations of 
women, which can voice on behalf of Kibera female residents.  
Nevertheless, there exists a very special kind of organisation called Church-Community-
Based Organisation, such as Carolina Kibera, which is very active in educating Kibera 
residents on HIV/AIDS-related issues. Despite the fact that most of Kibera residents are 
regular attendees of at least one church or the other and the church could be central in 
bringing Kibera residents together to deliberate the water problems and the way forward, 
this aspect has not been explored and exploited. 
4.4. Political intervention  
Kibera falls under Nairobi’s Langata constituency represented by de facto Liberal 
Democratic Party boss, Raila Odinga. Because of its population, Kibera voters always 
determine the Member of Parliament for Langata constituency. The prevailing political 
attitudes towards the conditions of Kibera residents have been at most verbal promises 
that are never followed up by action. A resident of Kibera, Jack Matunwa says: 
There is no politician in Kenya who will be interested to see our lives improving. 
It is easier for politicians to bribe and sway poor voters. We will always remain 
like this. (January 23, 2005 during a visit to Kisumu Ndogo in Kibera). 
Housing, security, health, education, water and sanitation are issues that politicians raise 
when seeking votes from Kibera residents once every five years. Kibera residents are 
promised an end to their misery by each constituency candidate as well as presidential 
candidates but that is as far as the issue goes. Once the electioneering period is over, 
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Kibera is forgotten. Perhaps worse for Kibera is the fact that they are always represented 
by an opposition member of parliament. The political culture of ruling parties is to 
‘punish’ opposition constituencies by ‘denying’ them development projects in basic 
service delivery like water. 
When politicians visit Kibera, it is hardly is about improving basic service delivery. They 
are usually out to seek votes through populist utterances, not to concern about the plight 
of Kibera residents because to them, the residents are there illegally, anyway. In one such 
case while campaigning for the then nearing 2002 elections, former president Moi visited 
Kibera and sparked clashes by suggesting that some landlords were oppressing the poor 
with unreasonably high rents.61 The slum dwellers of Kibera misconstrued the statement 
and refused to pay rents. The landlords hired gangs to evict the tenants and the clashes 
that ensured left 12 people dead and an estimated 3,000 residents homeless62. 
4.5. Information exchange and communication  
In Kibera, facilities for information exchange and communication are very poorly-
equipped. There are almost no fixed telephones in Kibera. Despite what NWC said about 
it “efforts” to set up telephone lines, there is in reality only a hotline available at NWC 
which can be used to report illegal connections. The few telephone bureaus that exist use 
mobile phones. Mobile phone charges in Kenya generally and Kibera particularly are 
very expensive and out of reach of any average citizen. Persistent vandalism has 
prevented Telkom Kenya from installing telephone booths in Kibera. Furthermore, 
Internet and email facilities are seriously in shortage. The only other option open for 
communication is through the inefficient and unreliable Kenyan postal system.  
4.6. Summary  
This Chapter has presented and discussed the existing water governance situation in 
Kibera which thereby highlighted the necessary and urgent demand to:  
                                                 
61 Kenya’s Slums: A new political Battleground Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1210/p6s3-
woaf.html  
62 KENYA: IRN Focus on Clashes 2001 Available at 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=18913&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=KENY
A  
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1/ figure out some possibilities of improving the current organisationss; and  
2/ involve an all-round and genuine participation of the State and the local authorities, 
including the police force, in the anti-illegal water connection network so that the current 
exorbitant water prices can be reduced.  
In the next Chapter, we will focus on analysing the particular case of PPP between NWC 
and MBK, whom we hope that enhancement of their relationship will be significant to the 
improvement of the present problematic water situation.  
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
BETWEEN NAIROBI WATER COMPANY AND MAJI 
BORA KIBERA 
5.1. A brief introduction to Nairobi Water Company 
5.1.1. Establishment and organisation 
Nairobi Water Company (NWC) was founded in August, 2004 to replace the Nairobi 
Water and Sewerage Department (NWSD)’s role of water provision and sewerage 
services in Nairobi and Kibera in extension. The company is a subsidiary of Nairobi City 
Council (NCC), which was blamed over the years for water mismanagement and poor 
service delivery by the Ministry of Water. NWC has its own operational autonomy to run 
its affairs without interference. It has separate offices from those of NCC for the sake of 
independence. Because it is separated from the daily operations of NCC, it is now able to 
invest and re-invest its revenue in improving its services.  
 
NWC headquarters 
With a staff of 8,000 employees, the establishment of NWC was regarded as an important 
turning-point in the water sector in Nairobi in terms of improving the water supply 
efficiency for Nairobi residents - both those living in formal and informal settlements. 
Some noteworthy things the company did shortly after its setting-up were to: 
i. Form a Board of Directors, who are drawn from the Nairobi City Council (NCC -
by the Mayor, Town Clerk, the City Treasurer, the chairman of the Water 
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Committee and the chairman of the Finance Committee), professional bodies, and 
other organizations in the public sector, the private sector and the civil society, 
including the Non-Governmental Organisation Council (the NGO Council), 
Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, the African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF), the 
Association of Hotelkeepers and Caterers, Plan International and the Managing 
Director, NWC. It is this Board of Directors that entered into a partnership with 
MBK to improve water service delivery in Kibera.  
ii. Form a new management team appointed because of their ‘professional credibility 
and integrity’, responsible for the company’s daily operations; 
i. Start installing  water meters and other equipment to enhance the service 
provision;  
ii. “Reconnect 25 telephone lines for 14 locations in Nairobi and acquire two 
hotline numbers for enabling its customers to reach the company more 
easily”63; and 
iii. Embark on staff training programmes to strengthen their personnel’s skills in 
various areas.  
The organisation of NWC is also restructured, described as in the chart in the next page. 
With the new organisation, the functions are defined as follows: 
i. The Board of Directors: the main power and function of this Board are to make 
decisions that determine the water provision in Nairobi.  
ii. The Technical Department: the major task of this department is the ’technical’ 
part of water services i.e. designing the pipe networks, the actual laying of pipes, 
repair of leakages, managing the metering system and ensuring all customers are 
metered for water used, and offering other technical-related services. 
                                                 
63 Nairobi Water News, Issue 1, November 2004 
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Company Chairman 
Company Secretary 
Board of Directors 
Human Resources 
Department 
Commercial Department Technical Department Financial Department 
iii. The Human Resources Department: this department is in charge of personnel 
training, employment, and setting specific job descriptions for personnel in the 
various departments. It is also concerned with stuffs promotions and retrenchment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compiled by Group 2249  
iv. The Commercial Department: is concerned mainly with marketing the company 
and making it profit-oriented. Such tasks as determining water prices, seeking 
corporate and individual clients and tailoring customer water needs are the 
responsibility of this department. 
v. The Financial Department: deals with day-to-day and long-term fiscal planning of 
the company. The department handles revenue collection, employee emoluments, 
paying contractors, preparing annual company budgets, and funding the 
company’s water investments. 
5.1.2. Mission and meter-bill related issues 
With the vision to be the leading provider of reliable quality water and sewerage services 
in Nairobi and its environs, NWC’s main responsibility is to “provide affordable water 
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and sewerage services through efficient, effective, and sustainable utilisation of the 
available resources in an environmentally friendly manner, and meet and exceed the 
expectations of our consumers and other stakeholders”64. In order to bring into practice 
this mission, NWC commits itself to: 
i. Provide meters free of charge and replace them free of charge, too, if they’re 
unintentionally damaged; 
ii. Issue accurate bills timely every month with a clear disconnection notice; 
iii. Restore water supply within 24 hrs after payments; and 
iv. Maintain the water charge, which is 0.65 Kenyan shillings for a 20-litre drum 
(as already mentioned under sub-section 4.3.1.). 
It is important to note that NWC’s staff, both the former and the current ones, have not 
respected the regulations of the company when doing their meter reading duties. They, 
instead, have embezzled the “revenue collection” and transferred this money to their own 
account under the name of Nairobi City Water Council Staff Self-Help Group and other 
private accounts even though they know that what they are doing is not only illegal but 
also criminal.  
5.2. A brief introduction to Maji Bora Kibera 
Maji Bora Kibera (MBK) is type of private enterprise representing hundreds of small 
scale water vendors operating in the Kibera slums of Nairobi. Originally, with a 
membership of 1500 registered water vendors, MBK has seen dwindling membership and 
currently, the active members paying the monthly membership fee, albeit erratically are 
500. By the time of carrying out our interview with MBK in late January, only 195 
members had paid their membership fee for January 2005.  
MBK member water tanks can be identified by their blue colour and yellow band with 
the organization’s motto of paying bills on time and fighting corruption. Since the 
inception of MBK, the officials say the relationship between PWVs and water consumers 
                                                 
64 Nairobi Water News, Issue 1, November 2004 
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has improved. This is because MBK members are encouraged and trained on courtesy 
and customer relations. 
 
MBK member water storage tank 
MBK members also wear blue uniforms with MBK membership cards displayed.  
5.2.1. Establishment and organisation 
The express aim of forming MBK was to offer uniform water prices to the residents of 
Kibera to make the water vending business more profitable. Many PWVs were concerned 
about ‘johnnies-come-lately’ who sold a 20-litre jerry-can at ‘bottom-rock’ prices of up 
to KES 1 at times. To counter this problem, a meeting of all PWVs was arranged at 
Olympic primary school in May 2004 where the issue of water pricing was discussed. 
The general opinion of the PWVs was that water prices needed to be raised. It was also 
felt that in order to enhance profitability for all the PWVs, a fixed minimum price had to 
be set so that water consumers paid a uniform price for a given quantity of water without 
regard to the vendor they bought the water from.  
Illegal water connections and the diverse network of bribe hunters were noted as the main 
problem for non-uniformity of water prices. In an effort to solve this problem, members 
resolved to work with the official arm of NWC rather than ‘cowboy’ ex- and current 
employees of the company who roamed through Kibera collecting water fees claiming it 
would be remitted to NWC. Members also discussed the fact that despite more profits 
 72 
Secretary (Undugu) 
Ass. Secretary (Lindi) 
Treasurer (Kisumu 
Ndogo) 
Assistant Treasurer 
(Soweto) 
9 Ex-officio members 
(Village Elders) 
accrued from illegal connections, there was no consistency. It was resolved that, in order 
for PWVs to have a stable daily income, then they had to work with NWC to solve the 
problem of rampant disconnections.  
MBK’s structure is hierarchical in nature as represented in the chart below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 Compiled by Group 2249 
MBK membership cuts across the nine Kibera villages. To ensure fair presentation, each 
village is represented by one official in MBK. All the Village Elders are ex-officio 
members of MBK as can be seen from the chart above.   
Chairman (Makina) 
Vice-Chairman  (Kianda) 
Organising Secretary  
(Gatwikira) 
Vice-Chairman 
(Mashimoni) 
Vice-Chairman (Laini 
Saba) 
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5.2.2. Vision and mission 
The short-term vision of Maji Bora Kibera is to: 
i. Legalize the connections of all members 
ii. Ensure water sold is metered 
iii. Ensure regular payment of bills 
iv. Fight against water corruption 
v. Police the water network against illegal connections 
Maji Bora Kibera hopes to streamline the ‘love-hate relationship’ with its consumers 
through consultations and information dissemination. According to the Organizing 
Secretary, MBK is concerned that consumers are never able to plan their water purchases 
in terms of quantity, quality and availability. This is because of frequent disconnections 
by people claiming to be from NWC. MBK believes that by working with the official and 
legal wing of NWC, such disconnections will only follow a notice of the same. 
Consumers will then be informed by MBK about the impending disconnection and given 
more relevant information concerning re-connection and alternative water vending points 
that will be operational within Kibera. 
MBK has already carried out an information campaign amongst its members on official 
bill payment points. 
5.3. Partnership between Nairobi Water Company and Maji Bora Kibera 
The vision of the partnership between NWC and MBK is to solve Kibera’s water 
problems. Both parties foresee a Kibera supplied with adequate clean water. NWC 
foresees a future where illegal disconnections will be a thing of the past. MBK also 
foresees a future where NWC will give MBK members subsidized water prices which 
will in effect boost their profits. NWC on the other hand hopes to start collecting revenue 
from Kibera – a financial boost long overdue. 
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5.3.1. History 
The history of MBK-NWC partnership is brief. It was launched in July 2004. Maji Bora 
Kibera made the initiative of forming the partnership and approached NWC with their 
ideas on improved water provision in Kibera. With the hope of boosting revenue 
collection following MBK’s acceptance to police the water network and report illegal 
connections, the board of NWC endorsed the partnership. The partnership was entered 
after a ‘give and take’ discussion. On its part, MBK made wanted the following 
concessions from NWC: 
i. Legalizing all illegal connections of MBK members 
ii. Subsidizing the water prices 
iii. Involving MBK in license issuance for new water vendors 
iv. Installing meters (free of charge) for MBK members whose connections 
don’t have meters 
v. Issuing notices whenever NWC planned to introduce water rationing 
vi. Launching a reliable and efficient billing system rather than the infamous 
estimations used by NWC 
vii. Instituting legal action against ‘independent’ PWVs and all those involved 
in illegal connections 
NWC in principle agreed to all of MBK’s demands and tabled its own: 
i. That MBK shall agree to have all the water sold metered and there shall be 
no connections by-passing meters; 
ii. That MBK shall report regularly, any suspicious connections to NWC’s 
hotline; 
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iii. That MBK members shall cease forthwith, dealing with any other party 
other than the official water meter readers; 
iv. That MBK members shall pay all bills at the NWC’s cashier office located 
at County Hall, Nairobi only and have a receipt of payment issued; and 
v. That MBK shall police the water network against tampering. Any person 
carrying out any suspicious activities on the water network should be 
reported to the police or to NWC through the hotline. 
It is imperative that we examine the MBK-NWC partnership against the background of 
the principles of public private partnerships. Our observations about this partnership 
include the facts that: 
• It has brought together representatives from the NWC and representatives from 
the MBK around the shared goal of water provision in Kibera.  
• MBK and NWC have each contributed time, money, expertise, or other relevant 
resources to the partnership. MBK contributes time and knowledge of the Kibera 
area in policing the water network against illegal connections and also spends 
money in paying water bills. NWC on the other hand spends time on connecting 
MBK members with water, money on water meters and piping equipment, and 
offers expertise on water networking. 
• MBK and NWC are working together towards the common goal of improved 
water access in Kibera though the levels of mutual understanding, respect and 
trust are questionable as our interviews revealed. 
• MBK and NWC do not have clear guidelines that determine decision-making. 
Neither are management responsibilities shared among these partners.  
• MBK initiated the partnership. From our findings, it seems that the necessary 
principles for PPP namely transparency, accountability, legitimacy and legality, 
equity, inclusiveness, and competition were not on its agenda. The partnership 
was sought in essence to lock out competitors operating as independent water 
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vendors. This in itself goes against the principle of competition. From our 
interview with MBK, it seems that once competition is eliminated, MBK plans to 
raise the water prices (despite the fact that they want to buy water at lower rates 
from NWC).  This goes against the grain of PPP where efficient and affordable 
service delivery ought to be an underpinning factor. 
5.3.2. Existing partnership problems and their effects on water supply for Kibera’s poor  
Despite the fact that the partnership between MBK and NWC ought to be at the 
honeymoon stage, there are teething problems experienced by both parties. We hereby 
examine the most pertinent of these. 
5.3.2.1. Lack of mutual understanding, respect and trust  
From our interviews with both MBK and NWC, it is clear that both parties lack mutual 
understanding, respect and trust. On the part of NWC, this is manifested by the fact that it 
believes that: 
 - MBK is still actively involved in illegal water connections and diversions 
 - Most MBK members are ‘crooks’ 
- That MBK members are involved in creating artificial shortages as an 
excuse for raising water prices. 
MBK on the other hand alleges that: 
- All illegal water connections are carried out with the full knowledge of a 
section of officials at NWC. 
- NWC is not interested in cleaning the water mess in Kibera because 
influential members of the board are actively involved in the water trade 
through proxies. 
- NWC regularly creates artificial water shortages in Kibera especially 
during the rainy season and during the Nairobi International Agricultural 
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show. A few vendors with good connections with NWC are served with 
the commodity. They make a kill while majority of MBK members go 
without water. 
From our interview with the organizing secretary of MBK, it was revealed that one of the 
biggest frustrations facing members of MBK stems out of sheer inefficiency of the NWC 
staff members, especially the cashiers at County Hall. He said that almost all the MBK 
members had complained about the frustrations they suffer at the hands of NWC cashiers 
who refuse to accept bill payments made in coins. The cashiers demand that MBK 
members first change the coins into notes in a bank before making their payments. 
MBK members are also sometimes turned away with their payments and asked to make 
their payments on a different day for no apparent reason. Whether this stems out of 
laziness, disinterest in work, or genuine commitments on the part of NWC staff is not 
clear. But MBK members feel the NWC staffs are outright lazy.  
5.3.2.2 Decision Making and Sharing of Management Responsibilities 
It is important that decisions are jointly made by partners in any PPP. This is made 
possible through the sharing of management responsibilities in some types of partnership 
like the one under study. In the case of MBK and NWC, this important feature PPP is 
absent. In such a scenario then, unity of purpose is compromised. This can be a catalyst 
for misunderstanding and mistrust. 
5.3.2.3. Principles of transparency, accountability, legitimacy and legality, equity, 
inclusiveness, and competition 
Transparency presupposes willingness by both partners to undertake common business 
ventures openly and above-board. This is meant to ensure accountability. It is important 
for both partners to be transparent as to their intentions of entering the partnership. In the 
case of MBK-NWC partnership, MBK seems to have sought for the partnership ulterior – 
maximization of profits. They sought to do this by shutting out competition thus violating 
the tenet of inclusiveness. The legitimacy and legality of the partnership itself is 
questionable because despite the exchange of memoranda, the partnership seems to be 
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based up ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. For partnerships such as MBK and Nairobi Water 
Company to work, both parties need to sign a legally binding agreement. 
Such misgivings on both parties pose a challenge that needs to be overcome in order for 
the residents of Kibera to reap the benefits of water availability and affordability. We 
believe that as long as the principles of PPP are not upheld, it is difficult for both partners 
to have a financially rewarding relationship. The residents of Kibera will be at the 
receiving end in terms of high water prices unless the partnership is streamlined and the 
problems cited above resolved. 
5.4. Summary 
This Chapter has presented some basic information of the two biggest actors in water 
provision in Kibera: NWC and MBK, and analysed the existing problems in the 
partnership which the two actors have been facing.  
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CHAPTER 6. POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVING THE 
CURRENT WATER GOVERNANCE CRISIS IN KIBERA 
6.1. The pre-condition for introducing the possibilities 
As we presented in the introduction and Chapter 4, despite the fact that Kibera is part of 
Nairobi city and most importantly the one housing or accommodating most of Nairobi’s 
workers, it is still an informal settlement. For that reason, the national and the local 
authorities have no care for either improving the current living structures, which are 
constructed haphazardly, or providing Kibera residents with such basic services as water 
and sanitation, namely there are no plans for in Kibera. Even though NWC has been the 
one supplying water to Kibera residents, the biggest existing challenge is that Kibera 
residents don’t pay for the water they consume not because they are not willing to pay but 
because they believe that water is a free source. In our opinions, the formalised status of 
Kibera is of first and foremost importance if we would like to introduce or bring into 
practice any plans or alternatives, otherwise the feasibility of our recommendations will 
be very low. In our interview with the technical director of NWC, we were also told that 
Kibera should be formalised. Therefore, the precondition for the recommended 
possibilities below is the formalisation of Kibera settlement.  
6.2. Establishing a local water governance dialogue involving a broad participation 
6.2.1. Why local water governance dialogues? 
At this point, we would first of all like to revisit the Dublin principles and the 
characteristics of ‘good governance’ for purposes of explaining why it’s necessary to 
organise local water governance dialogues for Kibera.  
Under the Dublin principles, it’s stated very clearly that: 
i. The development and management of water should involve the participation of 
the policy-makers, the public and private sectors, the civil citizens or the users 
from central to grassroots levels (Principle 2). This implies that a water 
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governance system can’t be regarded as being good or efficient if it fails to 
comply with this principle. 
ii. Women play a central role in the provision, management and safeguarding of 
water. 
iii. Water should be recognised as an economic good because it has an economic 
value in all its competing uses. 
Following the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific’s criteria of good governance, the assessment of a governance system should be 
based on participation, consensus-orientation, accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and inclusiveness and rule of law. 
Since these characteristics are interrelated, mutually reinforcing and intertwined, lack of 
any of them will affect the final appraisal.  
In the case of Kibera, the fact is that the water is not defined as an economic good even 
though it’s an (exploited) economic good in reality; it’s privatised in an illegal way 
(illegal connections); the public authorities fail to manage the water source by having let 
corruption interfere in and overwhelm almost all aspects of the implementation of water 
management; women are not involved in institutions in the management and 
development of water; the private sector (in this case it’s the Private Water Vendors – 
PWVs) take the advantage of the water scarcity to make illegal profitable business with  
great greed; the public and private mistrust each other and the water consumers are not 
well-informed of what’s going on with the water development and management locally 
due to severe shortage of information exchange and communication network.  
The dialogue on effective water governance, whose main objectives are to bring different 
stakeholders together, build trust among them and promote information exchange 
regarding water governance, in combination with criteria of good governance and the 
Dublin Principles 2, 3 and 4 will help to: 
a. Enhance the awareness of the government, the public sector, the private sector, 
the lone-rangers and individuals in Kibera as regards the current serious water 
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governance problems, especially the illegal water connection status quo; thereby 
addressing the indispensable roles of each stakeholders in improving the situation.  
b. Produce a clear statement of the economic value of water, thereby affirming that 
water is both a public good (as stated in the law) and an economic good; it has a 
specific value and it has to be paid in accordance with the consumed amount.  
c. Create a preliminary communication and negotiation platform for NWC and 
MBK as the first step to improve the working relationship between them, among 
which is to improve the mistrust.  
d. Improve the relationship between NWC, MBK and the lone-rangers; thereby 
encouraging them to join MBK.  
e. Improve the awareness of Kibera residents that water is a natural source and they 
thus don’t have to pay for their consumption. 
f. Provide Kibera residents with an open platform to state their viewpoints on the 
water pricing, supply and charge collection. In other words, this is a kind of 
referendum to collect Kibera residents’ opinions on improvements with reference 
to water pricing, water quality (clean and safe), water supply quantity, and water 
service. 
g. Create the awareness that the role of women in water management and 
development is crucial. 
h. Inform Kibera residents of the official partnership between NWC and MBK. 
This is also a way to introduce distributed governance to Kibera where various actors 
should participate in water development and management.  
6.2.2. Who should participate? 
As we do agree that governance in general and water governance in particular should not 
only lie within the state’s responsibility but also involve different stakeholders, the 
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participation of both formal and informal organizations in the local water governance 
dialogues is targeted. That is, participants of the dialogues should be: 
i. Minister of Water (as a representative of the State) 
ii. The Board of Directors of Nairobi Water Company (as a representative of the 
public sector) 
iii. Maji Bora Kibera (as a representative of the private sector),  
iv. Lone-rangers (as a representative of ‘independent’ water vendors) 
v. The Chief and Village Elders (because they belong to the ‘village elite class’ that 
can frustrate anything that takes place in their areas of jurisdiction) 
vi. Some representing water consumers (as representatives of individuals), both male 
and female.  
Aside from those participants, we also think of inviting church leaders – those who do not 
involve in the water affair as such but are quite influential to Kibera residents because 
almost every resident in Kibera attends one church or the other. If the church leaders 
agree to participate in working out the current water governance crisis, they will 
undoubtedly be the most efficient water message couriers to Kibera residents in general.   
6.2.3. Issues to be discussed 
The water governance issues are many, but at this dialogue, we think that some of the 
most important issues should be focused, which are: 
i. The current burning situation with illegal water connection: this issue is of high 
importance to be examined and discussed because it’s this problem that has made 
NWC suffer from huge water loss and Kibera residents suffer from exorbitant 
water prices. Solutions concerning how to prevent illegal water connection should 
be put on the table, too. 
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ii. Billing and meter-readers: as we mentioned earlier, many ex- and present NWC 
officers have misused their position to embezzle public money gained from the 
water. This action must be stopped, and this can only be done via a tight 
cooperation between NWC and water consumers.  
iii. Water charges, fines, subsidies and taxes: the water charges currently differs too 
much between NWC and PWVs because the former fails to control the water 
charges set by PWVs while the latter do not care about the extremely high prices 
they’re imposing on the innocent Kibera residents. Also, the State and NWC have 
not set up any fines framework regarding the misuse or illegal connection of 
water, neither have they subsidised the official prices, meaning that the public 
water charges are still high. Therefore, it’s important that a clear framework for 
water fines and subsidies should be established.  
iv. Clean water: as far as our interviews with the Organising Secretary of MBK, 
other small water vendors and water consumers are concerned, the water sold by 
MBK, lone-rangers, as well as water from boreholes are quite contaminated 
because the water pipes pass through the sewage, many of them are broken and 
that cause contamination and water-related sicknesses to Kibera residents. It’s 
thus important that in the enhanced partnership, NWC and MBK should consider 
concrete plans to improve the water-pipe system and assure the safety of the water 
they sell.   
v. Establishment of a water inspection board: one of the main factors that have 
contributed to the incredible water corruption situation is that there is no water 
patrol team. In order to bring the improvement of water governance into practice, 
it’s necessary to form a water inspection board, whose components should be 
representatives from NWC, MBK and the local police. Concerning the local 
police alone, we do believe that no one can have a better professional training and 
experiences to fulfil this hard task than them. Extra allowances for the police, due 
to this additional task, should of course be taken into account by NWC and MBK.  
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vi. Establishment of a water information exchange and communication network: it’s 
important that Kibera residents are informed of what’s going on with the water 
supply situation, locally, and they must also have sufficient possibilities to 
communicate with NWC and MBK as possible. We take it for granted that a 
public telephone line requiring affordable prices should be established so that 
water consumers can communicate with the mentioned organisationss when 
necessary.  
6.3. Establishing bilateral dialogues between NWC and MBK 
After the first dialogue with such a multi-stakeholder participation, it’s crucial that NWC 
and MBK have dialogues on their own and discuss specific plans and strategies for a 
genuine cooperation. As mentioned in sub-section 5.3.2., these two parties have coped 
with some teething problems, which can only be solved by face-face-face meetings. 
Having bilateral dialogues is a highly recommendable way for them to improve their 
current partnership problems.  
According to us, at these meetings, the two parties should put on their agenda clear 
guidelines for decision-making and sharing of management responsibilities, as well as 
concrete principles for their partnerships – the principles for Public-Private Partnership 
already presented under sub-section 2.5. It’s also a good chance for MBK to discuss with 
NWC in clear-cut way about figuring out all possible ways to make the lone-rangers to 
join MBK. On the other hand, MBK will have to commit itself not to keep on connecting 
the water from NWC illegally.  
Furthermore, the two parties have to put on the table two crucial things: 
i. Firstly, as stated above, NWC and MBK should consider concrete plans to 
improve the water-pipe system and assure the safety of the water they sell.   
ii. They should involve the police force in fighting with both illegal connections 
from the lone-rangers and the back-up by the “godfathers” Kamjeshi and Mungiki. 
Since now MBK is going to pay NWC for all the water it receives from NWC, 
NWC must be able to cover the allowances for the additional task the police have 
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to take care of. NWC and MBK can, together with the police force, form a tight 
cooperative relationship in order to fight against the water thieves. The chart 
below will demonstrate this: 
 
6.4. Forming an Association of Water Consumers 
The Association of Water Consumers is an informal organisation composed of 
representatives of households in Kibera, especially the women. This is because in Kibera, 
like most other African settlements (rural or urban), searching for water is considered a 
responsibility for women and children.  In our opinions, aside from the female 
representatives of the water consumers, there is a very important actor who should be 
involved in this association as a “conductor”: the church leaders. In this network, they 
will function as Leaders of the Association. Structure of this association can be described 
as follows:  
Nairobi Water Company (NWC) 
Maji Bora Kibera (MBK) The Police Force 
Compiled by Group 2249 
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Compiled by Group 2249 
In this structure: 
i. The Advisers will take care of the administrative tasks, communicate with the 
both female representatives of water consumers and Kibera residents, transfer 
messages about water to them, and finally deal with NWC and MBK.  
ii. The female representatives of water consumers are those taking care of meeting 
with the water consumers, who can’t reach the advisers or find it difficult to 
convey their messages to the advisers, for purposes of collecting opinions and 
wishes as regards water. These representatives will then transfer the message back 
to the Association Leaders.  
The founding of such an association is expected to protect and back up the water 
consumers in such aspects as sufficient water supply, reduced water pricing, prevented 
bribery demand, improved water payment service, etc. The Association will function as 
an effective instrument to handle the following major things: 
i. To terminate the artificial water shortages (the “dirty tricks”) created by MBK; 
Association Leaders (the church 
leaders) 
 
Female representatives of water 
consumers 
Kibera residents (water 
consumers) 
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ii. To negotiate with MBK as regards reducing the water prices to a relevant level, or 
else the Association itself will buy water directly from NWC with the prices that 
MBK has been offered by NWC;  
iii. To put the lone-rangers in a situation where they have to join MBK and thus 
contribute to eliminating the unhealthy competition between lone-rangers and 
MBK; and  
iv. To communicate directly with NWC concerning the arrogant behaviour and 
attitude of NWC’s staff when reading the water meters and collecting the bill 
payments.  
The birth of this association will no doubt put MBK in situation where MBK firstly can’t 
continue with charging Kibera residents high like before and its “dirty tricks” to sell more 
water to Kibera residents, and secondly have to enter into a cooperative and serious 
partnership with NWC so that it can be assured not to lose the water customers it has had.  
6.5. Some reflections on the recommendations 
Among the possibilities we have recommended, we’re first of all certain that the 
establishments of multi-lateral and bilateral dialogues are feasible because NWC and 
MBK would like to enter into a serious partnership, they are capable of organising such 
dialogues and they must also be aware that such kinds of dialogues are first of all for their 
benefits at hand. Secondly, the idea of forming an Association of Water Consumers is not 
new. In principle, it was already mentioned in the National Environmental Management 
Agency’s Institutional/Capacity Building programmes long time ago. Now it’s only time 
to carry out the idea (or “the plan on paper”). What may differ here are the components of 
the Association where the church leaders become the Leaders of the Association, and the 
female consumers are promoted to be representatives of the consumers.  
It’s our recognition that the church leaders will be very important because they represent 
what is ‘clean’ and ‘untainted’ in Kibera as far as corruption is concerned. They are also 
mainly non-partisan to the various tribal groupings in Kibera have followers from various 
tribes. The village Chief and Villagers Elders will therefore not interfere because church-
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related activities are beyond the description of their jobs (they will interfere in church 
related affairs only to restore order if for example chaos or fighting occurs). Church 
leaders demand respect from various players because of the large number of people they 
administer to. Antagonizing them is assumed to be an indirect provocation to their 
followers. It is also noteworthy that they represent the only class of people from whom 
bribes are never solicited in Kenya. In their involvement, water provision will 
unintentionally become a cleaner game to some extent in Kibera. 
6.6. Summary 
This Chapter has presented and elaborated some possibilities to improve the existing 
water governance crisis in Kibera. The next chapter will conclude all the major points of 
the project report.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
This project is concerned with the water governance crisis in Kibera (Kenya). It tries to 
grasp and analyse the ongoing multi-faceted problems, with slight concentration on the 
relationship between the public (represented by Nairobi Water Company) and private 
(represented by Maji Bora Kibera) sectors (Public-Private Partnership) in water supply. 
The discussions on water governance, institutions, Public-Private Partnership, the Dublin 
Principles, and the global dialogue on effective water governance give clear hints that the 
efficient participation of formal and informal organisations in the management and 
development of water is necessary and thus demanded. Accordingly, this project aims to 
generate a deeper understanding of the problems and thereby recommend some 
alternatives to improve the situation. For clarification it poses the question “What 
alternatives can be taken into consideration in an attempt to improve the current water 
governance crisis in Kibera, Kenya?” Eight characteristics of good governance and five 
characteristics of Public-Private Partnership are employed to answer the question. On the 
basis of our analysis we have come to the following conclusions:  
The first conclusion covers the theoretical discussions that we have been through in the 
project report, encompassing: 
a. Governance: governance is about the interactions that involve the participation of 
public and private actors solving societal problems or creating societal 
opportunities, attending to the organisationss as contexts for these governing 
interactions, and establishing a normative foundation for all those activities. 
Distributed governance, an expression referring to the involvement of formal (the 
public actor) and informal (the private actor and the civil society) organizations in 
the governance process, is of high value in governance. Governance, however, 
should touch upon the question of corruption due to the fact that corruption has 
been an issue interfering in the governance of society. Examples of corruption in 
USA, India, Pakistan, Italy, Kenya, etc. have proved that corruption is a term 
which directly relates to governance. Our study area, Kibera, which have been 
facing a severe situation of corruption in water governance, is the most typical 
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example. A good governance system should therefore be the one where corruption 
must be absent. 
b. Water governance: water governance is the ongoing process of extracting, 
distributing and using water created by the actors’ purposeful actions within the 
present organisationss wherein “actors” are the “purposive entities designed by 
their creators to/that maximise the wealth, income or other objectives defined by 
the opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of society” and 
“institutions” are “the rules of the games in a society”, according to North. In this 
process in the concrete context of Kibera, corruption plays a very important role 
in the implementation of rules carried out by a variety of actors in point.  
c. Institutions: institutions can be understood as “organisations” (institutional 
settings) and “the rules of the games in a society or the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” whereby the rules of the games can be 
both formal (written) and informal (non-written). There is another distinction of 
institutions by Scott which is also relevant for the case of Kibera: regulative 
institutions.  
d. Public-Private Partnership (PPP) refers to a kind of formal cooperation between 
the public and private sectors, supposed to harmonise the strengths and 
weaknesses of the two sectors enhancing the efficiency and sharing both profits 
and risks. Bringing this partnership into practice also means to follow some sound 
principles which help to assure that the implementation is on its right track. In 
connection with this aspect, Public-Private Partnership in Kibera is far from being 
efficient, and as a result causes direct effects on the availability and affordability 
of water for Kibera residents. 
Kibera has been coping with serious multi-faceted problems with water governance.          
Corruption is a factor which has been aggravating the water problems and considerably 
disrupted the water governance in general. The water governance in Kibera has been 
under a situation where: 
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a. The water law is not complied with while the legal and justice system is 
compromised (corruption interfered) 
b. Institutions are permeated by severe corruption, especially some informal 
institutions (the ‘independent’ water vendors or “lone-rangers”) are backed up by 
gangs (the local “godfathers”); 
c. Water charges set by Private Water Vendors (PWVs) are not controlled 
(corruption interfered) and thus become too high for Kibera residents; 
d. Water fines due to misuse or illegal connections of water are not a practice yet; 
e. The billing and metering system is inefficient; 
f. Public participation in decision making is not encouraged; 
g. Politicians do not care about this crowded slum because it is regarded as an 
informal settlement and thus no efforts for basic services are made; and  
h. Basic facilities for information exchange and communication like telephones and 
emails are seriously in lack of, meaning that Kibera residents can not report illegal 
connections to Nairobi Water Company (NWC). 
The existing problems in the Public-Private Partnership between NWC and Maji Bora 
Kibera (MBK) have contributed to the worsening of the water situation. These two actors 
are the two biggest water suppliers in Kibera under two different labels: public (NWC) 
and private (MBK). After a long period of acrimonious relationship, they decided to enter 
into partnership in 2004. Nevertheless, Public-Private Partnership (PPP), as a matter of 
fact, is not yet entrenched in the Kenyan society in general and in Kibera in particular. 
The young partnership between NWC and MBK consequently has not been fruitful but 
quite troublesome because these two parties lack mutual understanding, trust and respect 
(they have met each other only once since the establishment of their partnership). They 
don’t have clear guidelines for decision-making and sharing of management 
responsibilities, neither have they committed themselves to clear-cut water agreements 
(MBK only pays a small percentage for the total water it gets from the NWC network). 
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Moreover, such necessary principles for PPP as transparency, accountability, legitimacy 
and legality, equity, inclusiveness, and competition have not been put on their agenda. 
All these problems of course affect Kibera residents negatively because they still don’t 
get sufficient and affordable water.  
Improving the current water governance problems in Kibera is a very difficult and 
challenging task which demands efficient reform capacity, financial means, time, etc.; 
however, improving the partnership between NWC and MBK can be taken into 
consideration as one of the potential alternatives. Obviously it’s not possible to find an 
elixir for Kibera’s water problems within a day or year, especially in a context where 
Kibera’s legal status is not yet recognised, and corruption overwhelms almost all aspects 
of the Kenyan society generally and the Kibera area particularly. National and local 
efforts with appropriate assistance of the international community have to be made, 
following feasible and effective plans and strategies. At hand, it’s our practical thought to 
improve the NWC-MBK partnership because if these two players enter into a clear 
agreement where they will cooperate with the local police force to terminate the illegal 
water connections by lone rangers (and thereby making these lone-rangers join MBK, or 
form their own partnership with NWC. MBK has committed itself to pay for all the water 
it gets from NWC i.e. no more illegal water connections by MBK, and NWC has offered 
MBK an attractive price framework. There is potential that Kibera residents will have the 
chance of paying for water at lower prices.  
Possibilities to improve the partnership NWC and MBK include establishing a local 
water governance dialogue which should involve a broad participation of different 
stakeholders, such a Minister of Water, NWC, MBK, lone-rangers, Chief and Village 
Elders, church leaders, and water consumers; establishing bilateral dialogues between 
NWC and MBK for discussing concrete and practical guidelines, plans and strategies for 
a real and efficient partnership; and founding an Association of Water Consumers, who 
will represent and protect all the households using water in Kibera in terms of sufficient 
water supply, reduced water pricing, prevented bribery demand, improved water payment 
service, etc. These possibilities are initiated after our integrated knowledge of the Dublin 
principles, the global dialogue on effective water governance, the principles of PPP, 
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institutions, governance and water governance, and the specific situation of our area of 
study.   
The recommendations, according to us, are of high feasibility only if Kibera is formalised 
(the precondition). As long as Kibera is still regarded as an illegal settlement, national 
and local efforts are not made, and such illegal things as connecting and selling water 
illegally, offering and receiving bribes, etc. will keep on occurring seriously.  
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INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS  
We interviewed several private water vendors and many water consumers as well as the 
Technical Director of Nairobi Water Company and the Organising Secretary of Maji 
Bora Kibera. Below is a list of a sample of those who allowed us either to record them, or 
take notes during the interviews. 
Note: Q (Question); A (Answer) 
Interview 1: with J.P. Kimani - Technical director of Nairobi Water Company 
Q:        Ok, maybe first you can tell me your name.  
A:        My name is J.P. Kimani and I am the technical director of the company – the 
water company. 
Q:        Could you comment briefly about the inception of the Nairobi Water Company, 
just a brief history? 
A:        The inception of the Nairobi Water Company is the creation of the Water Act, and 
the Water Act was created after there were these problems of water service 
delivery to the citizens of Nairobi or to any citizens of a given local authority. 
One major problem was the investing of the resources, and this time I am talking 
about the revenue because the departments that used to operate the water and 
sewerage services were collecting money but this money was not specifically 
used for that service. Instead, the money was collected and used for other 
purposes by the local authorities. If I narrow down to Nairobi City Council, when 
the revenues were collected from whatever department, they were used for other 
uses such as paying salaries, paying contractors, etc. Very little amount was 
ploughed back to improve the water services. According to the Water Act, local 
authorities were required to have either a company or a way of handling water 
services separately. And for the Nairobi City Council, it decided to create its own 
company called Nairobi Water Company in short.  
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Q:        What’s the relationship between the Nairobi City Council and the Nairobi Water 
Company? 
A:        Nairobi Water Company is only owned by Nairobi City Council. We’re 
answerable to Nairobi City Council.  
Q:        So what is the difference between the Nairobi Water Company and the body 
you’ve just replaced – the Nairobi Water and Sewerage Department? 
A:        There’s a very big difference because when it was Water and Sewerage 
Department, it was answerable to Nairobi City Council. Now that it is on its own, 
it is a company, the autonomy that was lacking then, we are able to plan for 
finances and we plan for our resources so that we have nobody to complain to or 
to blame … Before you would say that we were helped by the City Council. Now 
we are on our own. We have the autonomy that we were fighting for.  
Q:       Which area are you currently supplying water in Nairobi? Is it the whole of 
Nairobi City?  
A:       Yes, we’re supposed to unless there is a failure. We’re supposed to take care of 
Nairobi City as a whole. Outside the city, there is Nairobi Water Services Board 
that takes care of that. Various companies and various performers will be 
identified to do that. 
Q:        Is your company involved in the provision of water to the residents of Kibera?  
A:       Yes, Kibera is part of the city, and in fact is the one housing or accommodating 
most of Nairobi’s workers. I would say over half of a million people reside in that 
place. Our biggest challenge is to ensure that water and sewerage services are 
made available to those places. The unfortunate thing is it’s an informal 
settlement, so there are no plans. But one condition for the creation of this 
company and the Water Act is that we must take care of the informal settlements 
when it comes to water services. In our business plans, we have planned for that, 
not only for Kibera but also for other informal settlements. It is unfortunate that 
they are not paying for the water that is there. But we are now working towards 
that end. They must pay for the water they are using. 
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Q:       Why are they not paying for it? 
A:        There is a bad or wrong conception that water is free and they must drink it. You 
know they just come and settle. They are advantaged because they take free land 
and then they settle. Water goes there freely by gravity and then they want to use 
it without paying. For us, why we want to have you paid is because we must 
meter you, and for us to meter you, we must plan for the network. In Kibera and 
other slum areas, those services (meters), the networks are not there. Unless you 
come to apply for a water kiosk, we book you, register you, you pay the necessary 
fees and then you have a water kiosk from where you can be selling water to those 
residents. Then those residents, through their own ukoras (mischief), will extend 
and steal that water illegally. We loose a lot of water in those areas. But now we 
want to formalize it.  
Q:        Do you license the private water vendors who operate in Kibera?  
A:        They are not supposed to (sell water). There was one time in 2002 we allowed 
them because there was a drought. And we allowed those water vendors because 
they could go out there, bring in water from boreholes and they assisted us in one 
way. But we came to realize that they were also messing our networks. They were 
creating artificial shortages so that they could get business. Nobody knew the 
sources of that water and we warned the public that if you buy the water - drink it 
at your own risk! We are only responsible for the water that we deliver, not by the 
water vendors - the water tankers. 
Q:        So you have officers. Is it the public health officers or the officers from your 
office? 
A:        We have our own chemists working in the laboratories. We dispatched them. I’m 
talking about 2002 when there was a drought. We had dispatched them to monitor 
those water tankers so that whatever that they were carrying, that water would be 
tested. If it was bad water, they would pour it. If it was good water, they would be 
allowed to sell it.  
Q:       But then of course after your officers have left, they can still sell the water? 
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A:       When the situation is improved, then we will say no more water tankers. But then 
you still see one or two. When you drink that water, we do not take any 
responsibility.  
Q:        On a visit to Kibera, we noticed that the pipes were lying in the sewage system 
and the water could be contaminated. Do you check that? 
A:       You know, once you are doing your own connections, you take the risk. I do not 
expect thieves to have any plan. You would expect that to happen, because even 
though they’re stealing those lines, they are not telling us they are extending. 
They are doing it illegally. They are doing it at night, at odd hours. So if there is a 
problem, it is theirs, not ours. We do not take that as our responsibility. It is only 
by luck that we have not had any problems so far. But we are advising them to 
abandon that. If they come to us, we shall give them technical advice. 
Q:        So what you are saying is that most of the connections in Kibera are illegal.  
A:        Illegal. I would say about 99% of them are illegal.  I give you a sample of what 
we have found in that area. Look at that! Those are illegal connections, so we are 
supposed to disconnect all of them, and then we formalize and reorganize them.  
Q:       And these illegal connections, of course they don’t pay money to your company? 
A:        They don’t pay. They say that our water is natural water.  
Q:        Is your company concerned about the digging of boreholes in Kibera? We notice 
that there are some vendors that sell the water.  
A:        No. In Kibera, we do not want to dig boreholes. As you know, the maintenance of 
boreholes is also expensive, and of course, that role belongs to the Ministry of 
Water. If you want to be in sink a borehole you must have their authority. But we 
have plans, or we have interest in some existing borehole places like Karen. 
Karen is one of the places we supply water. So we plan to rehabilitate the 
boreholes in those areas. But we do not intend to dig new ones.  
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Q:        Some of the water vendors in Kibera say that they usually have a lot of water 
problems, especially during the rainy season and during the Nairobi International 
Show.65  
A:       These are their imaginations. We haven’t had those cases. It is only that the 
Nairobi International Show takes place during the dry months of September to 
October when we have water problems. Whenever there are water shortages, they 
claim that the water has been diverted to the Nairobi International Show. But 
Nairobi International Show has its own water sources. They have boreholes and a 
dam. So it is only their imagination that water is being diverted to the show-
ground. 
Q:        There’s an organization of water vendors and kiosk sellers in Kibera called Maji 
Bora Kibera. Have you heard about it? 
A:        Yes.  
Q:        And they seem to have entered into a partnership with Nairobi Water Company. I 
don’t know whether you have any information about that.  
A:        We have met them once, and we have met many, not only one. They have very 
good ideas. They want to work with us.  
Q:        In which ways do they want to work with you? 
A:        They will be policing the lines so that illegal connections are minimized. Those 
lines will be metered so that they can pay. As you know, for now, even those 
water kiosks, sellers and people with meters, you cannot go and read those meters. 
You cannot disconnect water for those people. They will beat you up. So, MBK 
will be assisting us in this area. When we want to read the meters or disconnect an 
illegal connection, they make it possible. They will also guard their lines against 
new illegal connections. But for now, it is a free for all – illegal connections 
abound. 
                                                 
65 This is a popular annual Agricultural show where companies market their agricultural machinery and 
farmers show-case their produces. 
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Q:        What is the biggest challenge that the Nairobi Water Company has been facing in 
providing the people of Kibera with water?  
A:        Number one, these people must accept that water is not for free (they’re refusing 
to do that). Number two, we must have an adequate network to the place. It is an 
informal settlement, so the government must come in, formalize the settlement, 
and then we shall be there to meet the water needs. Number three, the culture of 
those people must also change. They must also agree to pay for what they are 
consuming at the moment because there is water. It is not that they are living 
without water. The challenge is how to make them agree to pay for what they’re 
consuming, how they are going to respect our services, how we are going to stop 
them stealing or making illegal connections from those lines existing there 
because we have some lines. I would say those are the biggest challenges.  
Q:        Could they be stealing the water because your price is unaffordable for them? 
A:        Not us. Our prices are not high. We sell water to people like you, people like me, 
those who can extend water to those places. Once a water kiosk is there, then that 
person does business. Unfortunately the water seller is also a crook.  He takes the 
advantage of monopoly. We sell to him water at cheaper price, but he takes the 
advantage of the monopoly to sell it at any price. But we have controlled prices. 
one way of meeting this problem is to allow more water kiosks to enable 
competition. In our business plan, we plan to go to those places with the view to 
introducing to many water kiosks. That’s the only way to bring down prices.   
Q:        Currently, what is the price of water, maybe for a 20-liter container that is sold by 
your company? 
A:        I don’t have specific figures. But what I know is they’re buying it here ten times 
more than that we are selling. The specific figures I don’t have here. You can get 
it in the Commercial Section. Sorry I don’t have them here.  
Q:       Thank you very much for your time. 
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Interview 2: with Samwel Ondambi - Organising Secretary of Maji Bora Kibera 
Q:  What’s your name, Sir? 
A:  My name is Samwel Ondambi but people usually call me masharubu (Mr Beards) 
because of my beards…I am the Organising Secretary of Maji Bora Kibera. 
Q:  What is Maji Bora Kibera? 
A:  Maji Bora Kibera is a private enterprise representing most of Kibera’s water 
vendors. The aim of forming this association is that we had a problem with 
differences in price between the different vendors, in some places there was water 
and in others there wasn’t. Some people were selling water highly while others 
cheaply. We also had a problem in that water would be disconnected without 
notice or information as to the reason why… and it would be reconnected in the 
same way. Essentially, we were in a business in which we did not know whether 
we would do business tomorrow… or the whole of next week. It was 
unpredictable. 
Q: When was Maji Bora Kibera launched? 
A:  May 2004. 
Q: How many members do you have? 
A:  When we launched our organization last year, we had 1500 registered members. 
But over the last few months, the commitments of many of the members are 
wavering. Last month, only 500 members paid their monthly membership fee. For 
this month, as we are speaking, only 195 members have paid. So we don’t know if 
more members will pay or not. We hope they will all pay. Many are shying away 
for their own reasons but others are making enquiries. 
Q:  When was your partnership with Nairobi Water Company launched? 
A:  We approached Nairobi Water Company in July 2004 with the idea of forming a 
public private partnership to improve Kibera’s water services. Two weeks later, 
we met the board and formalized the relationship. As water vendors, we were 
willing to help Nairobi Water Company official meter readers to have access to 
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metres. We were also willing to give Nairobi Water Company a list of the exact 
locations of all water vendors, both members and those who call themselves lone 
rangers. They think Kibera is a forest. Rangers are for guarding forests, not 
selling stolen water at throw-away prices! As I said, we wanted to assist Nairobi 
Water Company, and we wanted them to assist us in return. We wanted to give 
them a list of those with legal and illegal connections. We wanted to make it 
easier for them so that if they wanted to disconnect illegal connections, they knew 
exactly where to go. We also wanted to know in advance when and for how long 
water was going to be disconnected. 
Q:  The Nairobi Water Company is concerned that 99% of the water sold in Kibera 
emanates out of illegal connections… 
A: It is true, but all the illegal connections are carried out by staff of Nairobi Water 
Company. They come here in full uniform with the material and make 
connections. It is not easy to know at first whether the connection is legal or 
illegal. But when you ask around, you are told that he comes at the end of each 
month with a list of the people he has ‘connected’ and collects money. It is not 
easy to tell whether the money goes to the company or not. But from our 
partnership we now know such money does not reach the company. Other 
vendors pay money directly to the District Officer’s office. 
Q:  Why should they pay money to the District Officer’s office? 
A:  Some people say that someone at the District Officer’s office brought the Nairobi 
Water Company technical team to make the connection… and the Nairobi Water 
Company people told them to pay bills at the District Officer’s office. So, people 
just pay there. But we are trying to educate Kibera vendors on the legal 
procedures of getting legal connections. 
Q: What are the legal procedures? 
A.  You get a form from the Nairobi Dam and fill. Return the filled form with KES 
1,200, you make a second payment of KES 300 later and then KES 1,800. They, 
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when they are ready, they give you somebody to connect you. You also pay KES 
2,000 for the meter.  
Q:  How long does it take after paying all the necessary fees to have running water for 
your business? 
A:  There is no fixed period. It takes anything from 6 months to two years. When you 
make follow-up they say that there are not enough workers, that the workers have 
gone to Sasumua Dam, KARI or Kindaruma… But for illegal connections, after 
paying kitu kidogo, you will have your connection the same day or at the latest the 
following day.  
Q:  Is it possible to follow the legal procedures, pay all the required fees and have 
your water without bribing? 
A:  Not in Kenya! Bribery is in people’s blood. At times, they disconnect water 
deliberately, especially in Makina, near Moi’s place, water is usually 
disconnected, and water vendors raise money for the bribe, and have water 
reconnected after having paid the bribe. The Makina and Lindi non-members are 
also known to bribe so that lines serving Maji Bora Kibera members are 
disconnected for up to a week for no reason and they can sell water at higher 
prices while our members are out of business. 
Q: After six months into your partnership with Nairobi Water Company, what has 
improved for Maji Bora Kibera members? 
A:  The most important thing is that water bill estimates have gone down. Nowadays, 
the water meter readers actually come and take the exact meter readings. Bills 
also arrive at least once every two months as opposed to earlier on when 
sometimes you will receive a bill after three years. But we are still working on 
that because we want our members to receive monthly bills so that it is easier to 
pay. Those are the only things I have noticed so far. 
Q:  So, is there anything you would want the Nairobi Water Company to change for a 
better partnership? 
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A: The current system is not so bad, and the piping network is ok. Bills are a problem 
especially when paying because the water company staff do not allow us to pay in 
coins whereas we sell water in coins. They should retrain their staff that a coin is 
money, too. When we go to the bank to change, we are asked to open an account 
first.  
Q:  How much does a 20-litre water container cost? 
A:  Depends on the area… Makina 6 shillings, other places 4-5 shillings… Illegal 
water vendors, sometimes 10 shillings, sometimes 1shilling. The water meter 
readers also have arrangements with some registered water vendors. They reverse 
the meters so that the vendors don’t pay any money, then the money is shared. 
Many vendors also by-pass the meter together with the meter readers. Water is 
now expensive… The lone rangers want to push us out by selling water at KES 1 
at times just to annoy us. 
Q:  Nairobi Water Company staff say that they don’t work in Kibera, that whenever 
they try, they are almost beaten up. 
A:  There was just one case in Gatuikira when they came to disconnect water for no 
reason. Two were killed and one… I don’t know if he is still alive. But if they had 
passed through the Chief’s office and the Village Elders, come to us and we 
accompanied them, they would have done their work in peace. You don’t just 
walk into Kibera… Nobody knows you, and you start disconnecting water… 
Q:  What hopes do you have for better water provision in Kibera? 
A: Well, the Nairobi Water Company should clean its act, work with us and stop 
these thieves who sell water without paying. If all water sellers join Maji Bora 
Kibera, everything will be easier. 
Q:  Don’t you think competition is good for the consumer? 
A:  All of us in MBK compete in terms of service delivery and price. If all water 
vendors join MBK, it only means that we can all compete on a level playing 
ground. And all the dirty tricks will come to an end. 
Q:  How clean is the water you sell? 
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A:  Well, you have to boil it for at least 40 minutes before drinking. The water from 
bore-holes, even if you boil, it is still not good to drink, only for washing maybe. 
Water pipes pass through the sewage and many pipes are broken and that is a 
problem. Many people in Kibera are always sick because they don’t boil water for 
long enough because charcoal is also expensive.  
At this juncture, the interview came to an abrupt end because a wiring fault in an 
illegal electricity connection at the Organising Secretary’s home caused fire in 
the adjacent room and we had to scamper to safety. 
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Interview 3: with Private Water Vendor (near Lindi Mosque, Kibera) 
The owner declined to be video-taped but was willing to answer our questions. He also 
allowed us to take pictures of his water vending compound and to interview his customers. 
Q:  What is your name? 
A:   Leornard Onyango. 
Q:  For how long have you been in this business?  
A:  14 years. 
Q:  How much did a five-litre container of water cost 14 years ago? 
A:  In 1990, when I opened my borehole to business, five litres of water cost 50 cents, 
but now it costs 5 shillings during the normal water season and 10 shillings during 
water-rationing periods. So we normally wish for longer periods of water 
rationing because then we are able to save some money for the maintenance of the 
bore-hole. 
Q:  Who rations the water? 
A:  Nairobi City Council. 
Q:  Not Nairobi Water Company? 
A:  I think they are the same people. Yes, they call themselves a company now. 
Q: In which months of the year does rationing normally occur? 
A:  There are no specific months, but we make good business during the long rains 
from July to November 
Q:  Why is business better during the rainy season but not the opposite? 
A:  I don’t know, but taps are usually dry once it starts raining. I think they are 
blocked… I don’t know, ask Nairobi Water Company. 
Q:  On average, how many 5 litre containers do you fill in a day? 
A:  I don’t know. I don’t count. Some days we sell to hand-cart vendor, other days to 
normal customers, and other days to tanks. 
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Q:  I see a very long queue today. How many vibuyus do you fill on a day like this? 
A. On a bad day, I fill 30,000 vibuyus (20-litre jerry-cans) using all the six taps. My 
water is cheap… I charge only 5 shillings per kibuyu. So I don’t make much 
money like the sellers in Gatuikira and Kisumu Ndogo who charge 10 shillings 
express for everybody. 
Q: How many vibuyus do you fill on a good day? 
A: I told you I don’t count, I don’t know. 
Q:  How much money do you make on a bad day? 
A: I don’t count it. We are just trying to help these people. 
Q:  You said you sell water to both ordinary residents for domestic use, and to other 
vendors… 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Do you charge the same price to both types of customers? 
A:  Yes. The price is the same. The traders go to sell the water in other parts of 
Kibera and charge a higher price. 
Q:  Do you need a license to operate a borehole? 
A:   Yes. We require two licenses, one from the Public Health Office and another from 
the Nairobi City Council. 
Q:  How long does it take to get the licences once you apply? 
A:  There is no specific period. After paying the application fee, it depends on the size 
of kitu kidogo (bribe) one gives. But it is easier with the Public Health office 
because once you have seen an officer aside (bribed) then you get the license 
within a week. At the Nairobi City Council, sometimes you bribe one officer and 
then he directs you to another one. Then you have to give kitu kidogo again to the 
other officer. It is difficult there… the City Council. 
Q:  How much is the application fee for operating a commercial borehole? 
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A:  I don’t know. The Nairobi City Council officer I talked to told me it would be 
cheaper to apply to drill a borehole for personal use and I paid about 15,000 
shillings. He then fixed five taps for me. 
Q:  How much do you pay for kitu kidogo? 
A:  It is not even kitu kidogo anymore. It is kitu kikubwa (something big). I was asked 
for 50,000 thousand but I bargained and paid 30,000 shillings instead. 
Q:  I guess you were bargaining with the Nairobi City Council officials? 
A:  I can’t tell you that.  
Q:  What challenges do you face in your business? 
A:  Our main problem is with the Nairobi City Council. Sometimes, they change 
officers attached to Kibera and we have to re-negotiate kitu kidogo all over again. 
Q.  What do you think about the role of Nairobi City Council in water supply? 
A: I don’t know… 
Q:  Do you co-operate with Nairobi City Council in providing water for people in 
Kibera?  
A They just come in to disconnect water when we don’t agree on the amount of Kitu 
Kidogo, but I have a borehole for such times. 
Q: How would you describe your working relationship with Nairobi City Council? 
A: I don’t like that company. Nobody likes them. 
Q: Has your relationship with Nairobi City Council affected the prices and amount of 
water you sell? 
A: No. 
Q.  What problems do you face with Nairobi City Council regulations?  
A: I don’t know the regulations of that company. They just try to make life difficult 
for everybody. 
Q.  Is it complicated for you to get a licence for running a kiosk?  
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A: One must not have a licence to run the water business. There are just too many 
hands to greet (bribe). 
Q: What are the procedures and how long does it take?  
A:  I talked to one person and he organized everything for me. So I don’t know how 
long it takes filling all the forms and waiting. 
Q: What benefits will accrue to you if your relationship with Nairobi City Council is 
improved? 
A: It can’t be improved. 
Q:  Why? 
A:  Because everybody there is so corrupt and greedy. They want to take over our 
business. I have to fill that tanker now… 
Q:        Ok, thanks for your time. 
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Interview 4: with Monica Awino, Private Water Vendor (Gatuikira Village, Kibera) 
Note: The owner declined to be video-taped as well but allowed us to take notes in the 
course of the face to face interview. 
Q:  What is your name? 
A:   Monica Awino. 
Q:  For how long have you been in this business?  
A:  It is my husband’s business. He started it 9 years ago. 
Q:  Have you been helping him to sell water since the business started? 
A:  He works with City Council and I work here. 
Q: Do you know what work he does at the City Council? 
A: He works at the sanitary section. He is stationed at Huruma Market. 
Q: How much does a kibuyu of water cost? 
A: Five shillings… yesterday, I was selling at three shillings. But today in the 
morning we did not have water… so we had to raise the price. 
Q: Do you know how much you pay for a kibuyu of water to Nairobi Water 
Company? 
A: No. I only pay the bills to the meter reader when he brings it. 
Q: What is the average amount you pay in a month? 
A: It varies from month to month. I pay less during dry months, and more in months 
when we have water throughout. 
Q: How much do you pay in a month when there is abundant water? 
A: About KES 1,000. 
Q: Do you find it more convenient that the water meter reader comes for the money 
here? 
A:  Yes, it saves me the time of otherwise going all the way to county council offices. 
Q: Do you have any water bills with you? 
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A: No. They are in my house. 
Q: But the meter reader brings you a bill at the end of each month? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Does he disconnect the water if you are unable to pay? 
A: My husband knows him, so he gives us time to get the money and pay. 
Q:  What problems do you experience in your business? 
A: The water rationing is the worst because they forget about us. 
Q:  Who rations the water? 
A:  Nairobi Water Company. It was better when the City Council owned the water. 
Q:  Why? 
A: Because my husband knew many people and they used to leave our line. But now 
when the water is rationed, sometimes I have no business for a whole month. 
Q: In which months of the year does rationing normally occur? 
A:  Mostly from March to May. 
Q: And how is business during the long rains? 
A: It is good for those who get water. Sometimes I don’t get water, sometimes I do. 
Q:  Why is business better during the rainy season but not the opposite? 
A:  The Nairobi Water Company people block the water. 
Q:  On average, how many 5-litre containers do you fill in a day? 
A:  I don’t count. 
Q:  May I ask how much you make in a day? 
A. No, you may not! 
Q:  Do you sell water to hand-cart water vendors? 
A:  Yes. 
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Q:  Do you charge them the same price, too? 
A:  The price for water is the same 
Q:  Even when someone buys in bulk? 
A: Yes. 
Q:  Do you need a licence to sell water? 
A:   It is my husband who knows. 
Q.  What do you think about the role of Nairobi Water Company in water supply? 
A: They don’t know their work. 
Q: Do you co-operate with Nairobi Water Company in providing water for people in 
Kibera?  
A No, I have never seen them. 
Q:  How would you describe your working relationship with Nairobi Water 
Company? 
A: They told our officials (MBK) that there was going to be water all the time, but 
we still have the problem. 
Q: Has your relationship with Nairobi Water Company affected the prices and 
amount of water you sell? 
A: No. 
Q.  What problems do you face with Nairobi Water Company regulations?  
A: We told our officials all the problems and they went to talk with them. You 
should talk to the Organizing Secretary because he talked with the company 
people when they went there. 
Q.  Is it complicated for you to get a licence for running a kiosk?  
A: People say it is difficult. My husband knows some people. 
Q: So you don’t know the procedures and how long it takes?  
A:  My husband knows. 
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Q: What benefits will accrue to you if your relationship with Nairobi Water 
Company is improved? 
A: We just want them to stop disconnecting water for no reason. 
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Interview 5: with Sophie, a water consumer (Kisumu Ndogo, Kibera) 
Note: The interviewee declined to be taped and refused to give us her second name, but 
allowed note-taking. 
Q: What is your name? 
A: Sophie. 
Q: What about a second name? 
A: Sophie is enough. 
Q: Of course. You live in Makina? 
A: No, Kisumu Ndogo. 
Q: Why do you choose to come here rather than buy water from the vendors at 
Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi and Gatuikira which are near your home? 
A: I get a special price here. 
Q: How much do you pay for a litre of water? 
A: Two shillings. 
Q: How much do they sell water around Kisumu Ndogo? 
A: 5 shillings waiting and 10 shillings express. 
Q: How many vibuyus do you require for today’s use? 
A: I use six everyday because I have an infant. 
Q: Can you comment on the price of water in Kibera? 
A: It is very expensive. It is the most expensive thing when you calculate how much 
one spends on it in a month. 
Q: For how long have you lived in Kibera? 
A: I came here because my husband used to beat me up everyday. 
Q: Sorry to hear that. When did you come here? 
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A: February 1993. 
Q: How much did a kibuyu of water cost back then? 
A: It was cheaper then. I used to buy one for 25 cents. It just gets more and more 
expensive. 
Q: Are you able to get a special price here all year round? 
A: Well… yes, most of the time.  But there are times he doesn’t have water and I 
have to buy more expensively. Like during the Show. It becomes very difficult. 
Q: Have you heard about Maji Bora Kibera? 
A: Is it a TV programme on Kenya Broadcasting Station? 
Q: It is an organisation of water vendors in Kibera. They want to improve availability 
of water by working with Nairobi Water Company … 
A: They would most probably want to increase the prices! 
Q: Do your friends also feel that water is too expensive? 
A: Everybody is complaining. 
Q: Can’t you as consumers do anything about that? 
A: Like what? 
Q: I thought you would know about something that can be done by people like you 
as consumers to make the situation better for yourselves. It seems… 
A: If we had an organization then we can all refuse to buy water from the vendors 
until they reduce the prices. But there is no organization of women here. I think 
that is what we need. You can also tell the people who sent you here to help us get 
water more cheaply. 
Q: Well, we are just students doing research. Thank you for your time. 
A: What about something small to pay for the water? 
Q: Sure, here is 100 shillings. Will you now tell me your second name? 
A: (Laughing) No.  
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KIBERA PICTURES 
 
Cross-section of Kisumu Ndogo Village 
 
Cross-section of Lindi Village  
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Young boy with three vibuyus of water 
 
Residents obtaining water at Leonard’s kiosk 
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Kibera resident taking her turn at the tap 
 
Sewage and water flow together 
